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ABSTRACT
This Article asks whether it can ever be moral or legal to use certain criteria,
including nationality and/or religion, in formulating preferential immigration
policies. In order to answer the question, it presents an in-depth look at the
controversial “right of return,” focusing in particular on the example of the
Israeli Law of Return. It contains a detailed history of the law and its
development; a defense of the right of return in general; the principle and
contextual arguments in favor of an amendment to or abrogation of Israel’s law;
and a theoretical and practical defense of the law, with some ideas for potential
modification.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 18, 2016, Pope Francis gave an in-flight interview on his way
from Juarez, Mexico to Rome, Italy.1 The interview went viral2 because when
asked about Donald Trump’s plan to build a wall between Mexico and the United
States, the Pontiff responded that, “[a] person who thinks only about building
walls, wherever they may be, and not building bridges, is not Christian.”3
The comment ignited a firestorm of media attention as well as a back-andforth between the Vatican and Trump’s political camp that focused on context,
the role of religion in immigration policies, and what the Pope actually meant.4
While much has been written about the legal and religious implications of
keeping a particular religious group or nationality out of a given country5—a
question that was recently revisited when Trump called for a temporary ban on
all Muslim immigrants6—relatively little has been written about the opposite
idea: whether, to use the Pope’s analogy, a person can build a bridge that has an
express lane in for a particular nationality or religion.

1 Full Text of Pope Francis’ In-Flight Interview from Mexico to Rome, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/full-text-of-pope-francis-in-flight-interview-frommexico-to-rome-85821/.
2 See, e.g., Molly Hemingway, 5 Problems with Pope Francis’ Comments, FEDERALIST (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://thefederalist.com/2016/02/18/5-problems-with-pope-francis-comments-on-donald-trumps-faith/;
John
Hayward, Trump Vs. Pope Francis, BREITBART (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/
2016/02/19/trump-vs-pope-francis-immigration-compassion-and-national-legitimacy/; Hayley Hoefer, Views
You Can Use: The Pope Vs. the Donald, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/
2016-02-18/pope-francis-says-donald-trumps-views-on-immigration-arent-christian.
3 Hoefer, supra note 2.
4 James Martin, What the Pope Did, and Didn’t, Mean When He Said Trump Was Not a Christian, WASH.
POST (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/19/what-the-pope-did-anddidnt-mean-when-he-said-trump-was-not-a-christian/.
5 See, e.g., James R. Edwards, Jr., A Biblical Perspective on Immigration Policy, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD.
10 (Sept. 2009), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2009/immigration-biblical-perspective.pdf; Matthew
Soerens, Scripture and Immigration, WELCOMING STRANGER, http://welcomingthestranger.com/wp_
welcoming/learn-and-discern/scripture-and-immigration (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); What Does the Bible Say
About Refugees and Immigrants?, DISCIPLES HOME MISSIONS, 1–3 (2007), http://christianchurchestogether.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/01/What-Does-Bible-Say-Disciples-of-Christ.pdf; Sarah Larimer, Why Franklin
Graham Says Donald Trump is Right About Stopping Muslim Immigration, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/12/10/why-franklin-graham-says-donald-trumpis-right-about-stopping-muslim-immigration/; Jazz Shaw, So Is a “Complete and Total Shutdown” of Muslim
Immigration Legal?, HOT AIR (Dec. 8, 2015), http://hotair.com/archives/2015/12/08/so-is-a-complete-and-totalshutdown-of-muslim-immigration-legal-constitutional/.
6 Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN (Dec. 8, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-immigration/.
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This Article argues that while it may not be moral or legal to keep a group
out of a country based on their nationality or religion, it can, at times, be both
moral and legal to use the same criteria to build an express lane in a country.
While this idea is one that has implications for countries all over the world, the
example that we use to make this point is the somewhat controversial, oftdebated Law of Return in the State of Israel.
To begin, we move back in time just thirteen months before the Pope and the
current President had their through-the-media exchange, to a darker moment in
world history that led people to ask all kinds of questions about immigration,
law, and religion.
A. Overview
To all the Jews of France, all the Jews of Europe, I would like to say
that Israel is not just the place in whose direction you pray, the state of
Israel is your home. . . . All Jews who want to immigrate to Israel will
be welcomed here warmly and with open arms. We will help you in
your absorption here in our state that is also your state.7

With those words, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for the
Jews of Europe to take advantage of Israel’s Law of Return.8 His instruction
came at the heels of the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack which left
more than a dozen people killed—including four Jews who were slaughtered not
for anything they had allegedly done, but simply for what they were.9
Netanyahu’s words were echoed later in the day by Avigdor Lieberman, the
Israeli Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon; they both agreed
that the safest place for the Jews of Europe is Israel.10 On February 15, 2015,
just over a month later, a gunman in Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark,
attacked a synagogue where a Bar Mitzvah was being celebrated.11 Speaking
from his Cabinet meeting in Jerusalem, Netanyahu once again repeated the
following:
7 Justin Jalil et al., Netanyahu to French Jews: ‘Israel is Your Home’, TIMES ISR. (Jan. 10, 2015),
http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-to-french-jews-israel-is-your-home/.
8 See id.
9 When Jews Are Killed, No One Asks Why, TOWER (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.thetower.org/2780-charliehebdo-editor-when-jews-are-killed-no-one-asks-why/.
10 Netanyahu to French Jews: ‘Come Home to Israel from Terrible Europeans Anti-Semitism’, RT (Jan.
12, 2015), http://rt.com/news/221499-israel-pm-immigration-france/.
11 Copenhagen Shootings: Denmark Buries Jewish Victim Dan Uzan, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/11421109/Copenhagen-shootings-Denmarkburies-Jewish-victim-Dan-Uzan.html.
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Jews have been murdered again on European soil only because they
were Jews and this wave of terrorist attacks—including murderous
anti-Semitic attacks—is expected to continue . . . . Of course, Jews
deserve protection in every country but we say to Jews, to our brothers
and sisters: Israel is your home. . . . I would like to tell all European
Jews and all Jews wherever they are: Israel is the home of every Jew.12

Over the last couple of years, the rise of anti-Semitic attacks in Europe, and
the public call for European Jewry to take advantage of Israel’s Law of Return,
has coincided with the international focus on the legality and morality of letting
people in, or keeping people out, based on religious and national criteria. The
time has come for an in-depth look at the oft-criticized Law of Return itself,
from both a legal and moral standpoint.
The Law of Return, which was passed by the Knesset in 1950, gives all
Jewish people an unconditional right to immigrate to Israel and gain
citizenship.13 For many years, the law has been considered one of the
foundational stones in the ongoing construction of Israeli law14 and has enjoyed
wide consensus amongst the citizens of the State.15 In recent years, however,
voices from inside and outside of Israel have begun questioning its legitimacy
and wisdom.16
For simplicity’s sake, critics of the Law of Return can be usefully sorted into
two main categories. First, there are those who attack the law from a moral
standpoint, claiming that the law unfairly discriminates against non-Jewish
citizens of the State as well as immigrant applications from other nationalities.17
Second, there are those whose claims are focused not on the legitimacy of the
Law at the time it was passed, but rather on the continued legitimacy and
usefulness of such a law today.18 Critics point to two major changes that have
12 Cheryl K. Chumley, Benjamin Netanyahu Tells Europe’s Jews to Move to Israel, ‘Your Home’, WASH.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/16/benjamin-netanyahu-tells-europesjews-to-move-to-i/.
13 Law of Return 5710–1950, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/1950-1959/pages/law%20of%20return%205710-1950.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
14 David Clayman, The Law of Return Reconsidered, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. (July 16, 1995),
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/hit01.htm.
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Alex Stein, Is the Law of Return Unjust?, DAILY BEAST (May 10, 2013), http://www.
thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/10/law-of-return.html.
17 The Discriminatory Laws Database, ADALAH (May 30, 2012), http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/
7771.
18 Mark J. Altschul, Israel’s Law of Return and the Debate of Altering, Repealing, or Maintaining Its
Present Language, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1345, 1356 (2002).
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taken place since the founding of the State that, in theory, might obligate Israel
to revisit its immigration policies.
First, in contrast to the circumstances around the founding of the State, the
Jewish people today are no longer openly and systematically persecuted.19
Second, in the early years, the economic situation and security concerns in the
State of Israel left the country quite weak;20 however, today, both the economy
and the security of the nation are strong.21 Accordingly, the nature of those
seeking to immigrate to Israel has changed. In the first decades, immigration was
motivated by Zionistic aspirations and a desire to find sanctuary from hate and
persecution, whereas today, a substantial number of immigrants do so mainly
out of a desire to improve their quality of life.22 Critics of the Law of Return
claim that if these assumptions are true, they erode, or even entirely erase, the
moral basis for the right of those eligible to return.23 If correct, these assumptions
also make the current arrangement undesirable from the perspective of the State
of Israel’s interests.24
This Article will consider these two types of challenges. Ultimately, we
reject the fundamental arguments against the Law of Return while partially
accepting the contextual arguments. The following is a brief outline of how the
rest of the Article will proceed:
Part I will be dedicated to a historical review. We will describe the
circumstances that led to the enactment of the original Law of Return and the
way it has been used over the course of time, including the process that led to
the one fundamental amendment it has already undergone.
Part II will be dedicated to the presentation and the rejection of the
fundamental morals-based arguments. Our claim is that immigration
arrangements that give preferences based on nationality and/or religion can be,
and in this case are, consistent with the basic principles of liberalism. Every
person has a fundamental right to culture, and from this individual right we can
19

Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1368; see also REGIONAL AND ETHIC CONFLICTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FRONT LINES 97–98
(Judy Carter, George Irani, & Vamik D. Volken, eds., 2009).
21 Alex Brill, Israel’s Economic Growth Impressive, SUN SENTINEL (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.sunsentinel.com/opinion/commentary/fl-viewpoint-israel-20151105-story.html.
22 Hila Zaban, Becoming a Local Within a Bubble: Enclaves of Transnational Jewish Immigrants from
Western Countries in Jerusalem, 16 J. INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 1003, 1005–06 (2014).
23 See YORAM HAZONY, THE JEWISH STATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR ISRAEL’S SOUL 57–58 (2000).
24 Id. (referring to the arguments of critics who claim that the law must be repealed as it provides a means
for many “unwanted immigrants” to enter Israel).
20
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derive a nation-state’s right to self-determination. The logic underlying the right
to self-determination in a nation-state leads to the right of members of a national
group to migrate to their nation-state, as well as to the right or interest of the
nation-state to favor group members in their immigration policies.
In addition to this general justification, we will argue that the Law of Return
can be based on two unique justifications. One relies on the Jewish people’s right
to protection and safety from continued hatred and persecution, a right that all
members of a persecuted people have, and which is especially relevant to the
members of the Jewish nation.25 A second justification is based on the fact that,
contrary to other nations, membership in the Jewish nation is not contingent on
race or blood and that every human being is, in fact, able to join the Jewish
people through conversion.26 Furthermore, for the purposes of the Law of
Return, this conversion does not even have to have an overtly “religious”
orientation.
In Part III, we address the contextual arguments. As a preliminary issue, we
point out that accepting all of the proposed limitations on the Right of Return
will eliminate one of Israel’s founding principles. Israel has always believed that
the Law of Return does not grant a right to the Jewish people of the world; it
merely recognizes a right that every Jewish person already possesses, regardless
of what the State says.27 Obviously, any country is permitted to change its
founding principles, yet such a decision should not be taken lightly.
Getting to the heart of the matter, this Article agrees that a significant
percentage of the people making Aliyah28 today are not connected in any
significant way to Jewish culture and provides several explanations for this
phenomenon. We do point out, however, that the overwhelming majority of nonaffiliated immigrants to Israel eventually join the Jewish majority there,
adopting the culture and assimilating into Jewish-Israeli society.29 In light of this
reality, we argue that Israel should keep the current arrangement largely intact,

25 Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity, 13 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 233, 235 (1999).
26 Altschul, supra note 18, at 1353.
27 HAZONY, supra note 23, at 56 (citing David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister, Speech (July 3, 1950))
(reprinted in Jerusalem Post, July 19, 1957).
28 Aliyah has been defined as “the immigration of Jews back to their ancestral homeland.” See Defining
Aliyah: The Meaning and History of Jewish Return to Zion, INT’L CHRISTIAN EMBASSY JERUSALEM (Mar. 26,
2017), https://int.icej.org/aid/defining-aliyah.
29 Alexander Yakobson, Joining the Jewish People: Non-Jewish Immigrants from the Former USSR,
Israeli Identity and Jewish Peoplehood, 43 ISR. L. REV. 218, 226–27 (2010).
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since a high absorption rate serves the Israeli interest. However, we do note that
some immigrants who are given rights under the Law of Return are active
members of other faiths, and these immigrants tend not to become absorbed into
the Jewish majority.30 Therefore, we ultimately conclude that it is advisable to
amend the Law of Return to address this particular phenomenon.
The argument regarding the disappearance of anti-Semitism (or at least its
weakening) is regrettably rejected. We point out that while the reasoning behind
anti-Semitism does periodically change, anti-Semitism as a phenomenon
unfortunately continues to thrive even in countries where Jewish existence was
nearly extinguished after the Holocaust, as well as in countries like the United
States, where Jewish people enjoy a general sense of safety and prosperity.31 It
is further argued that the high rate and prevalence of anti-Semitism requires
Israel to respect every Jewish person’s right to immigrate to Israel, based on the
right to be free from persecution, without a need to prove actual persecution in
every instance.
I. HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The Law of Return (1950)
At the end of the British Mandate in Palestine, as the last of the British troops
departed, the members of the National Council of the Jewish Community
gathered and declared the establishment of the modern State of Israel.32 The
Israeli Declaration of Independence stated that “the State of Israel will be open
to all Jews.”33 This announcement was greatly needed in light of the severe
restrictions placed by the British authorities on Jewish immigration.34 These
restrictions had not been lifted even in moments of severe crisis and need, like
30 See Asher Greenberg, Israel, Designed to Absorb Jewish Refugees, Now Struggles with African Migrant
Wave, TABLET (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/158935/migrants-insouth-tel-aviv. See generally Minority Communities in Israel: Background & Overview, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.
(Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/minority-communities-in-israel-2.
31 See The 2013 Top Ten Anti-Israel Groups in the U.S., ADL (2013), http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/israelinternational/israel—middle-east/Top-Ten-2013-Report.pdf; see also Susan Jones, FBI: Jews Twice as Likely as
Muslims to be Targeted by Hate Crimes, CNSNEWS (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/
susan-jones/fbi-jews-twice-likely-muslims-be-targeted-religious-hate-crimes-us.
32 WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 252 (6th ed., 2016).
33 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Official Gazette, No. 1 of the 5th Iyar, 5708,
May 14, 1948, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+
Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm [hereinafter The Declaration].
34 Immigration to Israel: British Restrictions on Jewish Immigration to Palestine, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/mandate.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).

SAPIR_GOLDFEDER GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

LAW, RELIGION, AND IMMIGRATION

2/1/2018 2:59 PM

209

during World War II, when European Jews were systematically exterminated by
the Nazis, or after the War when hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees were
trying to enter the country in search of a safe haven.35 Thus, in its very first
meeting, on the day after the State was established—even before the
Representatives signed the Independence Scroll36—the Provisional Council
officially abolished the limits set by the mandate on Jewish immigration.37 In
doing so, they provided a ray of hope and assurance to post-Holocaust Jews
around the globe, essentially saying that they all had a home to come back to.38
While the gates of Israel were immediately and effectively opened to Jewish
immigration upon the establishment of the State, the Law of Return, which
legally enshrines the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel, was not passed
by the Knesset until July 5, 1950, over two years later.39 The main reason for the
time lag was the legislature’s original intention to encapsulate this right in a
constitution, which was supposed to be adopted shortly after the State was
established.40 The initiative to form a constitution, however, faced many
stumbling blocks along the way. Among these difficulties were the failure to
bridge some deep moral disagreements; the reluctance of the ruling party,
Mapai, led by David Ben-Gurion, to adopt a constitution that would limit the
government’s power;41 and possibly the transformation of the Constitutive
Assembly (elected for the sole purpose of establishing a constitution) into the
first Knesset, which weakened the interest of that body to establish a
constitution.42 The public debate over the constitution and its contents, which
lasted nearly two years, made it clear to everyone that the establishment of a

35 The policy, which was published in the 1939 “White Paper,” established severe limits on the continued
immigration of Jews to the country. See Palestine: Statement of Policy, Cmd. 6019 (May 23, 1939),
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/EB5B88C94ABA2AE585256D0B00555536.
36 The Independence Scroll was the document that established the State of Israel. Establishment of Israel:
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-declaration-of-the-establishment-of-the-state-of-israel.
37 The Declaration, supra note 33.
38 Id.
39 Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13.
40 See Mark Goldfeder, The State of Israel’s Constitution; A Comparison of Civilized Nations, 25 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 65 (2013).
41 See Ruth Gavison, A Constitution for Israel: Lessons from the American Experiment, 12 AZURE 133,
146 (2002). See generally Ruth Gavison, The Controversy Over Israel’s Bill of Rights, 15 ISR. Y.B. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS. 113 (1985).
42 See generally Gideon Sapir, Constitutional Revolutions: Israel as a Case Study, 5 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT
359 (2010).
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constitution was not yet possible.43 As a result, the Knesset turned to enshrining
the right of Jews to immigrate to Israel in a “regular” legislative act.44
The Law of Return was passed by the Knesset on July 5, 1950.45 The Knesset
member who introduced the bill stressed the importance of the date when the
law was passed since it was the anniversary of the death of Theodor Herzl, who
was considered the visionary of the Jewish State. Section 3 of the Law
established the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel. This right had minimal
restrictions and was denied only to those who “act against the Jewish People, or
may endanger public health or national security.”46 Four years later, another
section of the Law was added that denies the right to immigrate to someone with
“a criminal past, likely to endanger the public.”47 Over the years, the use of these
exceptions to limit the immigration of Jews to Israel has been minimal.48
B. The 1970 Amendment
Since its implementation, very few significant changes have been made to
the Law of Return. One notable exception occurred in 1970 following the
political crisis that arose from a controversial ruling by the Supreme Court of
Israel. We will briefly describe the Amendment and the circumstances
surrounding its adoption.
In the period before the founding of the State and in the early years of its
existence, no attempts were made to officially define the term “Jew”; anyone
who claimed to be Jewish was simply treated as such.49 In the beginning, the

43

See id.
Id.
45 Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13. The Knesset member who introduced the bill stressed the
importance of the date when the law was passed since it was the anniversary of the death of Theodor Herzl, who
was considered the visionary of the Jewish State. See Law of Return is Enacted, CTR. FOR ISR. EDUC.,
https://israeled.org/law-of-return-enacted/. This was the Hebrew date of his passing, 20 of Tamuz. Theodor
(Binyamin Ze’ec) Herzl, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Herzl.
html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
46 Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13.
47 1st Amendment, 5714-1954, SH No. 163 p. 174 (Isr.).
48 See, e.g., HCJ 9056/11 Marmelstien v. Minister of Interior, (Nevo Legal Database, 18.6.2013) (Isr.)
(original in Hebrew). In this case, the Court upheld the Minister of Interior’s decision to deny the Right of Return
to the Ukrainian husband of a Jewish Woman, who was convicted of attempted murder fifteen years before his
request. Id.
49 RUTH GAVISON, THE LAW OF RETURN AT SIXTY YEARS: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, JUSTIFICATION 45–46
(2009) (original in Hebrew). See ALEXANDER YAKOBSON & AMNON RUBINSTEIN, ISRAEL AND THE FAMILY OF
NATIONS: THE JEWISH NATION-STATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (2009).
44
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Law of Return also left this definition open, leaving room for a broad spectrum
of possible religious, social, and cultural interpretations.
The choice to leave the definition open was no accident—it was an attempt
to avoid the deeply religious and political question of who should be included.50
The question, however, could not be avoided forever; evading the question only
shifted the heavy burden from the legislative branch (who failed to define it) to
the executive branch (who struggled to implement an ill-defined law) and,
finally, to the Court, who had to review those executive decisions.51 The Court
addressed the controversy in several high profile cases,52 including the Shalit
case,53 which led to its amendment.54 The Shalit case was notable not only for
the hard substantive question it dealt with but also for the political and legislative
responses it evoked.55
Benjamin Shalit was a Jewish officer in the Israeli Navy who married a nonJewish woman, Anne, while he was studying abroad.56 When Anne moved to
Israel in 1960, she received a resident certificate, and in the registration
documents she was listed as having no religious affiliation.57 The couple had
two children. When Shalit went to fill out their registration, he listed them as
having no affiliation under religion, but as Jewish under the rubric for national
affiliation, despite traditional Judaism being matriarchal. When the registration
clerk refused to let this through, Shalit petitioned the Supreme Court of Israel.
He claimed that a person should be able to belong to the Jewish nation without
being a member of the Jewish religion.

50 See generally Gideon Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature
Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1233 (2006). Some scholars claim that the lack of definition was not based on a desire to avoid controversy, but
on the mistaken assumption that there was no controversy, and that everyone agreed. See Moshe Silberg,
Personal Status in Israel 349 (1965) [Hebrew]. See also Comments of the Minister of Justice, Shapira, in the
Knesset deliberation prior to the Amendment of the Law of Return in 1970. 5 Major Knesset Debates 1948–81,
1697 (Netanel Lorch, ed. 1993).
51 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 61–69 (describing the dispute and the Court’s role in resolving it). See
generally Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The
Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, supra note 50.
52 See Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13.
53 HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior 23(2) PD (II) 477 (1970), translated at Selected Judgments
of The Supreme Court of Israel, Special Volume, 35 (1971) [hereinafter Shalit].
54 Rebecca Weiner, Judaism: Who Is A Jew?, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.
org/jsource/Judaism/whojew1.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
55 Religion: Who Is a Jew? TIME (Feb. 2, 1970); Weiner, supra note 54.
56 See Lawrence S. Nesis, Who is a Jew, 4 MANITOBA L. J. 53 (1970).
57 Id.
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Reflecting the tremendous importance of the case, an unprecedented panel
of nine justices sat to hear it.58 Before it issued an opinion, the Court asked the
Government to delete the national affiliation category entirely, which would
have mooted the question once again. The Government, however, refused, and
by a narrow majority of five against four, the Court granted the petition,
instructing that the children be registered as belonging to the Jewish nation.59
The decision surprised many in the traditional religious community, and amidst
the public and political upheaval, the National Religious Party threatened to
leave the coalition, which would have caused the Government to crumble.60 In
an effort to alleviate tension, the Law of Return was amended to include the
definition of a Jew; the new section defined a Jew as a person born to a Jewish
mother or who had converted and did not belong to another religion.61
This marked the first time that a definition for the term “Jew” was codified
in law, and the definition provoked much criticism.62 The Amendment
significantly narrowed the eligibility to immigrate and left outside of its
parameters many people who felt strongly connected to the Jewish people.63 In
an attempt to accommodate such individuals, the Knesset introduced another
amendment to the Law of Return, which greatly expanded the Right of Return
by granting this right to any family member of an entitled person (i.e., a “Jew”
by the above-mentioned definition), up to a third generation regardless of the
family member’s religious affiliation.64 Section 4A of the 1970 Amendment
vests the right to immigrate to Israel in the following individuals: “a child and a
grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child and a grandchild
58

Currently, fifteen justices serve on the Supreme Court of Israel. Id. at 56. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court,
where the entire bench presides over all cases, the Supreme Court of Israel usually sits as a bench of three. The
Judiciary: The Court System, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/
democracy/pages/the%20judiciary-%20the%20court%20system.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). However,
there is a possibility of expanding the panel. Id.
59 For a discussion of the judgment and the related circumstances, see id.; PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN
JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 196–200 (1997); Altschul, supra note
18, at 1345–65; Noah Baer, Who is a Jew? A Determination of Ethnic Status for Purposes of the Israeli
Population Registry, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 133 (1971).
60 Nesis, supra note 56, at 80; see also N.R.P. Walkout Threat, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 25, 1970, at 1
(discussing the N.R.P’s threats to quit the coalition in the event of the registration not being amended by way of
legislation).
61 Id. Following the Amendment of the Law of Return, the Court rejected an additional petition filed by
Shalit in which he requested to have his third child, who was born after the decision in the first petition, registered
as a Jew. See HCJ 18/72 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23(1) PD (1) 334 (1972) (Isr.).
62 Shachar, supra note 25, at 245.
63 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 67.
64 Knesset Amends Law of Return to Define “Who is a Jew,” CTR. FOR ISRAEL EDUCATION (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://israeled.org/knesset-amends-law-of-return/.
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of a Jew.”65 This Amendment rejected the Shalit case approach, in which the
Court had treated the determination of Jewishness according to religion as
distinct from the determination of membership in the Jewish nation; but, at the
same time, it extended eligibility to numerous non-Jews who could now make
the Aliyah.66
While the 1970 Amendment provided a definition of “Jew” in the context of
the Law of Return, the Knesset failed to determine the nature of the conversion
process that was necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of the Law.
Hence, from this point onwards, the question was no longer “who is a Jew?” but,
rather, “who is a Jewish convert?” For a long period of time, the Orthodox mode
of conversion enjoyed a monopolistic status in the context of the Law of
Return.67 However, in 2005, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that the State
should confer equal recognition to all conversions conducted abroad by a
recognized stream of Judaism (Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform).68 As we
shall explain later, this shift can be thought of as a crucially important fact in
discussing allegedly discriminatory immigration policies.
II. THE PRINCIPLED ARGUMENT
A. The Argument
In recent years, many voices have arisen that challenge the legitimacy of the
Law of Return. The argument is that the Law, on its face, discriminates against
non-Jewish citizens of Israel69 as well as people of other nationalities that wish
to immigrate.70 Before we begin, we should note that the Law of Return is not
the only option for those that are interested in immigrating to Israel. Aside from
this special provision, there is the general immigration law, which allows for

65

Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5710–1950, SH No. 586 p. 34 (Isr.).
Id. at 67.
67 See Altschul, supra note 18, at 1353.
68 HCJ 2597/99 Toshbeim v. Minister of the Interior, 59(6) PD 721 (2005) (Isr.); see Sapir, How Should a
Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is
a Jew as an Illustration, supra note 50, at 1247–50.
69 See, e.g., CHAIM GANS, THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM 141 (2003) (“There is no doubt that the principal
injustice that the Law of Return causes . . . stem[s] from the fact that it grants such advantages to one nation
within a state which includes members of more than one nation entitled to self-determination.”).
70 See, e.g., Shachar, supra note 25, at 236–37 (“[U]nlike most other countries, while Israel regulates the
flow of immigrants to its territory, it also permits an unrestricted entitlement to membership for a particular
group of persons . . . . The problem with this otherwise embracing immigration policy is that it does not embrace
all potential immigrants.”).
66
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immigration under certain fairly standard conditions, with especially generous
access if the individual seeking immigration has familial ties to an Israeli
citizen.71 Critics, however, believe that the law unjustifiably places non-Jewish
Israeli citizens and persons of other nationalities in an inferior position by
bestowing an automatic immigration right to Jewish people.72
The State of Israel is not the only country with immigration procedures that
give priority to a particular nation; indeed, many countries have legislation
premised on a “Right of Return.”73 Thus, this criticism is not leveled against the
Israeli Law of Return alone, but, rather, targets any similar immigration
legislation.74 The pertinent question is, therefore, whether any nation’s use of
national affiliation to distinguish between immigration applicants violates the
duty to act with equality.75 This question will be answered herein.
B. Discussion
1. Insufficient Answers
The Declaration defines Israel as a “Jewish state.”76 The Supreme Court of
Israel has repeatedly ruled that the Jewishness of the State is a “constitutional
basic fact” underlying the activity of state authorities.77 Israeli law internalized
71
The Citizenship Nationality Law provides three ways by which to acquire Israeli citizenship: residence,
birth, and naturalization. Citizenship Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1951–52) (Isr.).
72 See Raef Zreik, Notes on the Value of Theory: Readings in the Law of Return—A Polemic, 2 L. &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 34313 (2008).
73 See, e.g., Ústavní zákon č. No. 23/1991 Sb., Listina Základních Práv a Svobod [Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms] art. 14, para. 4 (“Every citizen is free to enter the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic. No citizen may be forced to leave her homeland.”) (This Charter was enacted by the Czechoslovak
Federative Republic and preserved in the constitutional systems of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic.);
MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY art. XIV, para. 1
(“Hungarian citizens shall not be expelled from the territory of Hungary and may return from abroad at any time.
Foreigners staying in the territory of Hungary may only be expelled under a lawful decision. Collective expulsion
shall be prohibited.”).
74 See, e.g., Jeff Spinner-Halev, Unoriginal Sin: Zionism and Democratic Exclusion in Comparative
Perspective, 18 ISR. STUD. F. 26, 33 (2002); Alexander Yakobson, Jewish Peoplehood and the Jewish State—
How Unique?, 13 ISR. STUD. 1, 1–27 3, 5 (2008); see also Ruth Gavison & Nahson Perez, Days of Rest in
Multicultural Societies: Public, Private, Separate?, in LAW & RELIGION IN THEORETICAL & HISTORICAL
CONTEXT 186, 206–07 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008).
75 See generally Li Weiwei, Equality and Non-Discrimination Under International Human Rights Law,
NORWEGIAN CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (2004).
76 The Declaration, supra note 33. The Declaration also affirms that the State and its laws would “be based
on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel.” Id.
77 EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19(3) Isr. SC 365,
385 (1965).
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this basic element in its constitutional documents,78 as well as in political and
social areas. For example, Israeli election legislation disqualifies a candidate list
that negates the Jewish character of the State.79 The State of Israel enshrines in
legislation the status of the institutions of the Jewish people.80 It uses the Jewish
culture in the State’s symbols and official ceremonies and establishes the
Sabbath and Jewish holidays as the official days of rest.81 It gives the spirit of
Jewish law a certain status in the ruling of the courts.82 Israeli law also preserves
in legislation the remembrance of the Holocaust,83 compensates Holocaust
victims,84 and judges Nazis for their crimes.85 It applies the Penal Law of the
State of Israel towards offenses against Jews as Jews, even if committed outside
its territory and towards non-citizens.86 In fact, the Declaration itself references
the concept of Return as a major founding principle of the State.87
The identification of Israel as a nation-state, and the anchoring of its national
character in its established immigration practices, are not unique to Israel. As
Rubenstein and Yakobson point out, many countries—especially in Europe—
are categorized as nation-states.88 One of the most significant and common
identifiers of nation-states is the preference of certain nationals in the

78 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 p. 150 (1992); Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454 p. 90 (1994).
79 Basic Law: The Knesset, as amended at 5745-1985, SH No. 1155 p. 196 (1958) (Isr.) (A list of candidates
will not participate in elections to the Knesset if its aims or actions, expressly or by implication, deny the
existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.).
80 See, e.g., World Zionist Organizations and Jewish Agency for Israel Status Law, 5713-1952, 7 LSI 3
(1952); Jewish National FundKeren Kayemet LeYisrael Law, 5714-1953, 8 LSI 35 (1958).
81 The State of Israel as a Jewish State, KNESSET, http://knesset.gov.il/constitution/ConstMJewishState.
htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
82 Law of Legal Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, § 1, 34 LSI 181 (1980).
83 Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Commemoration (Yad Vashem) Law, 5713-1953, SH No. 132 p. 144 (1953);
Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day Law, 5719-1959, SH No. 280 p. 112 (1959); Denial of Holocaust
(Prohibition) Law, 5746-1986, SH No. 1187 p. 196 (1986); State Education Law (Amendment No. 5), 57602000, SH 122 (2000) sec 2(4).
84 Invalids (Nazi Persecution) Law, 5717-1957, SH No. 43 p. 111 (1957) (Isr.); Claims by Victims of the
Nazis or Their Satellites (Regulation of Handling) Law, 5717-1957 (Isr.); Victims of Holocaust Property Law
(Restoration to Successors and Dedication to Support and Perpetuation), 5765-2005 (Isr.).
85 Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment Law), 5750-1950, SH No. 57 p. 281 (1950); CC 40/61
Attorney General v. Eichmann 45 PM 45 3 (1961) (Isr.); CrimA 336/61 Eichmann v. Attorney General 16 SC
2033 (1962) (Isr.); CrimA 347/88 Demjanjuk v. State of Israel 47(4) SC 221 (1988) (Isr.).
86 Penal Law (Amendment No. 39), 5737-1977, SH No. 1481 p. 348 (1977).
87 DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL MAY 14, 1948 (“The State of Israel
would be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles.”). This is seen as a reference to the
Biblical promise of the Ingathering of the Exiles in Deuteronomy 30:1-5.
88 See generally YAKOBSON & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 49.
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immigration policy.89 Of course, it is true that the argument that “everyone does
it” cannot substitute the need for an independently normative justification for
the nation-state model, with its various characteristics, including a preferential
national immigration policy. Similar things can be said with respect to the
argument that the right to self-determination, including the right to determine
nationality-based immigration policy, is recognized by international law;90 this
is certainly a relevant datum, but it cannot substitute the need for an
independently normative justification for the nation-state model and the
preference of members of one particular nation in the immigration laws.91 Even
if international law justifies nation-states and the practice of preferring members
of one nation in the immigration policy, we need to ask ourselves if this is a
moral behavior. We will examine this question in the next section but, for now,
we simply note that many scholars throughout the last century have taken up this
question with similar conclusions. Henry Sidgwick notes that states can restrict
immigration to protect “the internal cohesion of a nation,”92 while James Hudson
and David Miller list protecting the ethnic and cultural makeup of the society as
one of the justifications for restricting immigration.93 As a recent article noted,
“whether one finds the justification in a liberal theory94 or a communitarian
theory,95 the literature on the justifications to restrict immigration is vast and
well-established.”96
Another possible answer to the question of prima facie discrimination
proposes to distinguish between discrimination within the community (i.e.
amongst community members) and discrimination in relation to non-members
89

See Christian Joppke, Comparative Citizenship: A Restrictive Turn in Europe?, 2 L. & ETHICS HUM.
RTS. 128 (2008) (providing a useful review of immigration policies in the Western world).
90 G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 1 (Dec. 21, 1965).
91 See generally AVIAD BAKSHI & GIDEON SAPIR, A Jewish Nation-State: A Discussion in Light of the
Family Reunification Case, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 487 (Gideon Sapir, Daphne
Barak-Erez & Aharon Barak eds., Hart Publishing, 2013).
92 See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 309 (4th ed. 1919).
93 See James L. Hudson, The Ethics of Immigration Restriction, 10 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 201, 212 (1984);
David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 193, 199
(Andrew Cohen & Christopher H. Wellman eds., 2005).
94 See generally WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); Joseph H. Carens,
Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251 (1987); Stephen Macedo, When and Why
Should Liberal Democracies Restrict Immigration?, in CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND HUMAN NEEDS (Rogers M.
Smith ed., 2010); Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 661 SOC. RES. 491
(1994).
95 See Miller, supra note 93, at 204.
96 Liav Orgad & Theodore Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in Immigration Selection 120 Years
After the Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENTARY 237, 296 (2010).
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within the claim itself.97 The argument is simply that the principles of justice
apply within a particular community but are not binding in the same way
regarding community members’ attitudes towards non-members.98 If this
argument is true, it at least refutes the claim that the Law of Return
“discriminates” against immigration applicants from other nationalities.
This possible distinction is accepted by a number of writers from the liberal
camp.99 In our view, however, this type of argument is not convincing, if only
because it is anachronistic. The assumption underlying the position that the
application of the principles of justice is confined to the political unit is probably
the applicability of principles of justice derived from a type of social contract.
Given the reality of life in the 21st century, where legal and physical boundaries
between countries are blurred and many parts of the world are working in
coordination and cooperation, one can certainly argue that the social contract
crosses political boundaries. Indeed, international law increasingly develops
tools for international intervention in matters that were considered internal not
long ago.100
A milder version of the distinction between the interior and the exterior
suggests that the degree of commitment of one person to another derives from
his or her level of proximity. According to this version, the duty of a man
towards his family is stronger than his obligation to the community in which he
lives; the second duty is greater than the obligation to the citizens of his state,
which, in turn, is greater than his duty towards the rest of humanity.101
Interestingly, this is a traditionally Jewish position, at least in regard to the
provision of charity and social services.102 We tend to accept this version, but,
in our opinion, this alone cannot justify a blatant preference of one nationality
over other nationalities in immigration policy. As noted above, the interrelationship between states around the globe today has been significantly

97 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
But see Carens, supra note 94, at 251–73.
98 See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (Aliens outside the sovereign territory have usually been considered outside the
protections of the Constitution. They may have claims under international or statutory law, but the Constitution
does not generally apply extraterritorially to noncitizens and, therefore, does not provide substantive
constitutional protection to aliens outside the sovereign territory.).
99 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 97. But see Carens, supra note 94, at 251–73.
100 See Daphne Barak-Erez, The International Law of Human Rights and Constitutional Law: A Case Study
of an Expanding Dialogue, 2 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 611, 612 (2004).
101 See, e.g., Ze’ev Maghen, Imagine: On Love and Lennon, 7 AZURE 119, 155 (1999).
102 See Babylonian Talmud: Baba Mezi’a 71.
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strengthened. If commitment is the result of a factual connection, strengthening
the connection should strengthen the commitment. Accordingly, we believe that
the attempt to reject the claim of discrimination against non-Jewish immigration
applicants on the grounds that Israel has no pre-existing obligation towards them
remains somewhat less than fully convincing.
Even if we were to accept the distinction between the internal and the
external, it would only help in dealing with the problem of discrimination
towards immigration applicants; it would not address the alleged discrimination
against Israeli citizens who do not belong to the Jewish nation. At first glance,
one could argue that an immigration policy favoring the dominant nationality
has no bearing on the status of citizens who do not belong to this nation. This
was apparently the position taken by the Supreme Court of Israel when it
determined that “a special key to enter the house was given to the Jewish people
(see the Law of Return), but when a person is inside as a lawful citizen, he
enjoyed equal rights with all other household members.”103 However, we tend
to agree with Chaim Gans, who believes that “preferences in immigration are
not only external preferences of potential immigrants from one type over another
type of potential immigrants. They also reflect internal preferences, the
preferences of one group of citizens in the host country over other citizen groups
belonging to it.”104 Thus, even if the Law of Return does not infringe upon the
rights of non-Jewish immigration applicants, it certainly touches upon the lives
of Israeli citizens who belong to the minority of Arab-Palestinians,105 if only by
sending a message about societal order and hierarchy.
Therefore, it is our opinion that the Law of Return cannot be fully justified
by the claim that “everyone does it,” by the argument that Israel has no
obligation towards people of other nationalities who wish to immigrate, or by
the assumption that the Law of Return does not compromise the right to equal
treatment of minorities living in Israel. The justification for the Law of Return
has to be found elsewhere if it is to be convincing.

103

HCJ 6698/95 Kaadan v. Israel Lands Administration 54(1) PD 258 (2000) (Isr.).
CHAIM GANS, FROM RICHARD WAGNER TO THE RIGHT OF RETURN 202 (2006); see also Gideon Sapir,
Book Review - Yakobson & Rubinstein: Israel and the Family of Nations, 11 DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 295, 319–
23 (2009).
105 Shachar, supra note 25, at 263.
104
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2. Preferential Immigration Policy and the Right to Self-Determination
a. The Right to Culture and Its Justifications
In recent decades, many liberal thinkers have begun to suggest justifications
for the right to culture. The various proposals can be usefully divided into four
main formulations, which we will briefly review.106
[Will] Kymlicka holds that life within the framework of a certain
culture serves as an imperative condition for affecting the right to
autonomy. [Charles] Taylor feels that a person’s right to preserve his
specific culture derives from the right to dignity. In his opinion, a
person’s human need to be respected by his environment deserves
recognition. In this framework the uniqueness of each person, which is
expressed through his culture, must be honored. [Moshe] Halbertal and
[Avishai] Margalit are convinced that a person’s culture constitutes a
fundamental component in his self-identity, and therefore the right to
culture is a derivative of the right to identity. Finally, [Chaim] Gans
feels that each person has the right to act for the realization of
significant dreams and considers a person’s cultural choices as the
effectuation of such a dream.107

All of the formulations described conclude that the right of human beings to
live within the framework of their culture should be recognized.
b. Does the Right to Culture Entail a Right to a Nation-State?
If there is a right to culture, does it lead to a right to self-determination in a
nation-state? There are two arguments that likely lead to a negative conclusion:
First, it can be claimed that it is possible to realise the right to culture
to a sufficient degree in sub-state community frameworks, and if so,
there is no justification to demand a nation-state. Second, effectuating
the right to culture of a national group within the framework of a
nation-state might entail infringing on the right of cultural minorities
in that state, including those minorities’ right to culture, so its
realization should be limited only to sub-state frameworks.108

106
107
108

BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 487.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 489–90.
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This is to say that even if a majority’s right to culture cannot be fully realized
in a sub-state framework, the benefits of full as opposed to partial realization are
not offset by the costs to minorities’ rights.
As a result, many “liberal thinkers who support the right to culture feel it
should be realized only as part of a multicultural state, and not a nation-state.”109
Other liberal writers, though, believe that realization of the right to culture might
require recognizing the right to a nation-state.110
Finally, it can be argued that providing a nation-state to certain cultural
groups would in some way discriminate against other cultural groups in the
world that do not receive the right to self-determination in their nation-state. This
lack of equality obliges us, so the argument goes, to relinquish the idea of a
nation-state also on the part of the cultures that do indeed benefit, or might
benefit, from realization of the right.111
c. The Right to Culture Does Entail a Right to a Nation-State
While these arguments carry some weight, at the end of the day, we believe
that they fail for three reasons: (i) a nation-state is necessary for sufficient
realization of the right to culture; (ii) the harm to members of minority groups is
minimal, and many are willing to accept it; and (iii) in this fulfillment, no harm
is done to global justice.
i. A Nation-State is Necessary for Realization of the Right to Culture
While it is true that cultural rights can be realized to a certain degree in a
multicultural system, the status of a nation-state grants protection to the national
culture to an extent and power that cannot be compared to the protection given
by a multicultural state.112 For example, a nation-state can assign resources and
operate in the international arena to foster the majority’s culture among its
members and protect cultural-national dispersion. In contrast, it is doubtful
whether a multicultural state can shoulder the task of assisting the dispersion of
each sub-member cultural group. In addition, the nation-state, by its very
109

Id. at 490.
Id.
111 See id at 487–502.
112 Lubna S. El-Gendi, Illusory Borders: The Myth of the Modern Nation-State and Its Impact on the
Repatriation of Cultural Artifacts, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 485, 505–06 (2016). See generally Liav
Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 53 (2010).
110
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existence, constitutes a focal point that consolidates the consciousness of the
members of the national culture around it.113 The Israeli instance, and its
relationship with the Jewish diaspora communities, serves as an excellent
example of this last point.
In our opinion, the protection provided by a nation-state has become
especially important in the modern era, marked by its accelerated secularization,
emphasis on individualism and freedom, and the release of familial and
communal bonds. In this reality, members of cultural groups can no longer lean
only on the power of old communal frameworks and need a stronger tool,
especially one that is institutionalized, to preserve their group culture. In an age
where the framework of groups and communities has difficulty standing firm,
state protection of national culture, within the framework of a nation-state,
becomes especially vital.
ii. The Harm to Members of Minority Groups Is Minimal and Many Are
Willing to Accept It
Even if we were able to show that the model of the nation-state is necessary
to achieve the right to culture, it would still be necessary to show that one can
keep safe the rights of cultural minorities living in that state, including their right
to culture.
We believe that the protection of the rights of minorities is quite possible,
even in a nation-state. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish between the
protection of individual rights of members of minority groups and the protection
of their collective minority culture. As for individual rights, certain practices
within the framework of a nation-state may create a strain on various rights of
minority group members. However, the inevitable tension between rights is a
recognized reality in the discourse on constitutional rights and is nothing but the
result that collisions between values are an integral and irrevocable element of
human life. As we know, constitutional law develops different balancing
mechanisms in cases of conflict between values.114 As in our case, and in other
constitutional dilemmas, a balance should be struck between the right to self-

113 See, e.g., DIASPORA AND MULTICULTURALISM: COMMON TRADITIONS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
(Monika Fludernik ed., 2003).
114 In recent years, proportionality has become the most widespread balancing formula. See, e.g., AHARON
BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans., Cambridge
University Press 2012); MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURE (Cambridge University Press 2013).
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determination of the majority group members and the rights of members of
minority groups that are in question. At the end of the day, certain practices will
be disqualified115 or limited, while others are approved.
As noted, the nation-state will be required to respect not only the individual
rights of members of minority groups but also their cultural rights. Within this
framework, there will be space to examine the option of granting autonomy,
partial or complete, to the minority group members on various matters relating
to the preservation of their culture. There is no reason to assume that this is not
possible.116 The cultural rights of minority groups will be maintained at the
community level, while the cultural rights of the majority will be maintained at
the state level; by definition, this means that the culture of the minorities will not
enjoy equal status of the national culture.117 But this fact should not, in our
opinion, outweigh the benefits of the nation-state model. Optimal realization of
the right to culture of majority groups in the various nation-states is preferable,
in our opinion, even in the face of the partial inequality caused to minorities who
enjoy the right to community (and not state) culture. Furthermore, from the point
of view of minority groups within nation-states, there is, of course, the
possibility that elsewhere in the world their culture does have a nation-state as
well. In such a case, one could easily argue that the value of the existence of
another state where their culture is a state culture is larger than the damage
involved in defining their country of citizenship as a nation-state of another
nation.
iii. No Harm is Done to Global Justice
Some, like Chaim Gans, have argued that, since there are various cultural
groups in today’s world that do not have self-determination in their own states,
there should be a waiver of the nation-state concept by those who do enjoy this

115

For example, a few years ago, the Supreme Court of Israel struck down an established policy according
to which Arab-Israeli citizens were not able to join Jewish town communities. HCJ 6698/95 Kaadan v. Israel
Lands Administration 54(1) PD 258 (2000) (Isr.). The Court ruled that their right to equality overrides the
community’s interest in preserving its Jewish character. See Id.
116 For instance, the State of Israel confers on minority religions a monopoly in matters of personal status.
See Sec. 51-57 of The Palestine Order in Council, 1922, which is still valid.
117 Certain aspects of the minority’s culture could be nationalized. For example, we see no reason why
democracies should not include some national holidays to coincide with a minority group’s religious festivals,
especially if the relevant minority is sizeable. In some countries, like Slovenia, South Africa, and Macedonia,
the minority language is the official language of the state. See Languages Spoken in Each Country of the World,
INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0855611.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
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right to prevent inequality.118 Others, like Charles Taylor,119 disagree for two
main reasons:
First, any social rectification takes place gradually, and one should not
expect it to be effectuated all at once. Second, the fact that one group
does not receive full protection of its rights does not justify detracting
from the protection granted to another group.120

By way of analogy, just as the fact that the rights of citizens of a totalitarian
state are curtailed does not justify undermining the rights of the citizens of a
democratic neighbor, the fact that certain groups are unable to realize their right
to national culture on a state level does not justify the denial of the right of
members of national groups that can be realized.
d. Justification on the Basis of Persecution
Even those who are unconvinced by the attempt to establish the right to selfdetermination in a nation-state on the right to culture may accept another
justification—this rationale, which is in some ways more limited in scope,
argues for the right of the Jewish people (and peoples like it, with relevant
characterization) to a homeland. These justifications are based on the
circumstances of Jewish people as a nation that has suffered fierce persecution
throughout its history and is still an object of hatred.
Some scholars, like A.B. Yehoshua, are of the opinion that the Holocaust
revealed the fact that Jews could no longer exist without having a state of their
own, and that “the right of survival” provides a normative justification for the
establishment of a Jewish nation-state.121 The argument includes the notion that
a person under serious threat may defend himself, even at the expense of the
legitimate interests of a third-party, provided that this will not lead to the thirdparty experiencing the same level of shortage or threat that the person himself is
trying to escape from.122 Although there may not often be a justification to
establish a nation-state, as it could violate the right to equality of citizens who
are not among the preferred nation, it is justified when there is a nation under

118

See BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 492.
Charles Taylor, Why Do Nations Have to Become States?, in RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES: ESSAYS ON
CANADIAN FEDERALISM & NATIONALISM 40 (G. Laforest ed., 1993).
120 Id.; BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 492.
121 BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 493–94.
122 In some ways, the rationale is not unlike the tort law doctrine/defense of necessity. See Ploof v. Putnam,
71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908).
119
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threat of persecution.123 This is true even if those citizens who may be affected
bear no special responsibility for the plight of the persecuted, so long as it does
not put them into the same predicament that the persecuted faced.124
Yehoshua gives his argument in the context of a post-hoc rationalization, but
in our opinion this argument is strong enough ab initio and would even obligate
other nations to assist in the realization of this right, as there is a principal
obligation of humanity to ensure that a persecuted group finds a haven.
C. Application
To be clear, assuming that a nation-state’s existence can be justified, it is not
the case that this justification automatically extends to any practice that the
nation-state claims is related or even necessary to the definition of the state as a
nation-state. Each practice will still have to be reviewed to (a) determine the
strength of the link between the practice and the justified nation-state, and (b)
weigh the practice against the harm it could theoretically cause to minority
rights. If we are correct that the arguments above justify the existence of a
nation-state of Israel, the more focused question still remains: Does the Law of
Return actually withstand this review?
The first question can be answered with relative ease. The Law of Return is
not only linked with the idea of the nation-state, but a nation-state is also
required based on this idea. We explained that the right to self-determination in
a nation-state is based on two main considerations: the right to culture and the
right to protection from persecution.125 As Gans points out, each of the rationales
leads one directly to the right to immigration:
If the purpose of the right to self-determination is to protect the interest
of members of national groups to adhere to their culture and to live
within its framework, what is the point in recognizing this right without
seeing the will of the members of these groups to migrate to where they
have self-rule in order to realize their desire to adhere to the culture
and live within its framework the justification of allowing them to do
so? And if the purpose of self-determination of many national groups
is to serve as a security anchor and a refuge from persecution for their

123
124
125

See ABRAHAM B. YEHOSHUA, FOR NORMALITY (1980) [Hebrew].
See id.
See supra II(B)(2)(c)(i), II(B)(2)(d).
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members, what is the point to recognize this right without recognizing
their right to seek refuge as part of this self-determination.126

These two considerations base the Law of Return on the legitimate interests of
Israeli immigration applicants. To these, one can attach a third consideration
concerning the interests of citizens of the state who are of Jewish nationality. It
seems clear that if a people of a certain nationality have the right to selfdetermination in any territory, then this right is accompanied by the right to take
actions that will ensure the continued existence of that right. For our purposes,
it is also apparent that one of the conditions defining any political entity as a
nation-state is that that nation will constitute a clear majority of citizens in that
state.127 Of course, not all means to achieve such a majority can be justified, but
it seems that among the range of existing means for the preservation of the
majority, giving priority to immigration to the people of that nation-state is a
reasonable means.128
What then do we do with the question about the degree of harm to citizens
who do not belong to the majority group? We turn to this question in the next
section.
D. The Law of Return and the Geo-Political Reality
As a general policy, it seems fitting that if a nation-state is entitled to prefer
the national group members when formulating immigration policy, a somewhat
preferential treatment in immigration should in due course be accorded to certain
minority groups residing in it, especially if these minority groups are indigenous.
Such a policy would greatly reduce the harm to members of the minority groups
and the subjective sense of inferiority they experience. However, such a policy
is contingent upon two conditions: First, that these minority groups are not
accorded self-determination in another nation-state and, second, that these
minority groups do not question the national character of the state in which they
live and do not attempt to actually change it.129 The first condition is required
because the aforementioned preference in the immigration policy stems from the
desire to allow members of the minority group to benefit from the opportunity
to live among members of their culture. If members of the minority group have

126

GANS, FROM RICHARD WAGNER TO THE RIGHT OF RETURN, supra note 104, at 207.
Learning to Live Together, UNESCO, https://www.globalconnect.socsci.uci.edu/files/webppts/
intro2intrelations/02%20-%20Nation-States.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
128 See generally GAVISON, supra note 49, at 39–41.
129 See generally GAVISON, supra note 49, at 39–41.
127
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their own nation-state, their interest to live among their culture may be exercised
in that state. This removes or at least weakens the commitment of another nationstate, in which some members of the minority group live, to allow them to
migrate into its territory. The second condition is implied because one cannot
require members of a majority group in a nation-state to actively assist those
seeking to repeal the national character of their state.
In the Israeli context, the two conditions are not realized. As we know, Israel
has faced difficult security challenges since its establishment.130 In fact, the
conflict began even before the establishment of a state, from the date when it
became clear that the Jews were actively operating to fulfill their desire for selfdetermination in the Land of Israel.131 From that date, the country’s non-Jewish
inhabitants started acting violently in order to thwart the fulfillment of the Jewish
aspiration.132
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations decided to resolve the bloody
conflict by the partition plan, dividing the land of western Israel into two states—
an Arab-Palestinian state and a Jewish state.133 The Jewish community in the
Land of Israel accepted the decision, while the Arab-Palestinian public rejected
it and started a war in order to wipe out the Jewish community.134
After the British military evacuated the area at the end of the U.N. mandate,
Israel declared its independence and, at the same time, Arab armies invaded
Israel and joined the battle against the Jewish community.135 The war ended with
Israel’s victory, but much of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the
Jordan River remained under Arab control.136 Surprisingly, an independent
Palestinian state was not established in that territory; the territory and its
inhabitants were divided between Egypt (Gaza) and Jordan (the West Bank).137
For many years, the Arab states continued to try to destroy the Jewish state.138
During those years, Palestinian terrorist organizations worked alongside the
130 See CHARLES D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 87–100 (Bedford/St. Martin’s,
9th ed. 1992)
131 Id. at 152–174.
132 See id.
133 See id.; G.A. Res. 181, Partition Plan (Nov. 29, 1947); see AHRON BREGMAN, ISRAEL’S WARS: A
HISTORY SINCE 1947 7–9 (Jeremy Black ed. 2000).
134 BREGMAN, supra note 133, at 9 (“If the Jews are going to take our land then by God we will throw them
into the sea.”).
135 Id. at 26–27.
136 Id. at 13.
137 Id. at 32.
138 Id. at 40.
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Arab armies.139 These organizations tried to tip the scale of the battle through
acts of terror against the civilian population in Israel.140
In the early 1990s, an historic breakthrough was achieved with the signing
of a political agreement between Israel and the Palestinian leadership, at the base
of which there was an agreement on mutual recognition and a division of the
country into two states.141 Unfortunately, the agreement has not yet been fully
realized.142 Without getting into the question of who is to blame, there are a
number of facts of particular relevance to our purpose.
First, it has become increasingly clear that even if the Palestinian leadership,
or at least part of it, agrees to accept the fact of Israel’s existence, it is not
prepared to recognize the Jewish people’s right to self-determination within its
borders.143 In other words, there is a limited willingness to recognize Israel as
an independent state, but there is no willingness to recognize Israel as the nationstate of the Jewish people.144 This unwillingness to recognize the right to selfdetermination of the Jewish people is not limited to the leadership of the
Palestinian public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;145 many of the leaders
of the Palestinian minority in Israel also refuse to recognize the legitimacy of
Israel as the Jewish nation-state.146
The refusal of the Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line (separating
Israel proper and the West Bank and Gaza Strip)147 to recognize Israel as the
Jewish nation-state seems puzzling, especially given that the State of Israel has
repeatedly been willing to allow the creation of the nation-state of the Palestinian

139

Id. at 33.
Id. at 49–50.
141 Declaration of Principles, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/
foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
142 Faisal Al Yafai, The Dream of Oslo Has Not Died, It Has Just Faded Away, THE NATIONAL (Sept.
12, 2017).
143 See, e.g., Gabriel Avner, Abu Mazen: ‘We Will Not Recognize Israel as a Jewish State’, JERUSALEM
ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2014, 1:49 AM), http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/middle-east/israeli-palestinianrelations/abu-mazen-we-will-not-recognize-israel-as-a-jewish-state-4131.
144 See id.
145 Id. See At UN, Israel’s Netanyahu Says Conflict is ‘Not About Settlements’ But Existence of a Jewish
State, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55041#.
WbS0nNOGM6h.
146 See THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE HEADS OF THE ARAB LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ISRAEL, FUTURE
VISION OF PALESTINIAN ARABS IN ISRAEL 5, 11, 28 (Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi ed., 2006).
147 See Fact Sheets: The 1967 Border – The “Green Line”, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-1967-border-the-quot-green-line-quot (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see also At UN,
Israel’s Netanyahu Says Conflict is ‘Not About Settlements’ But Existence of a Jewish State, supra note 145.
140
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people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.148 Either way, this refusal could
also explain the claim of the Palestinians that, if and when a permanent
settlement is achieved, the descendants of Palestinians who left the territory of
Israel within the Green Line during and as a result of wars will have the right to
return to their original homes.149 To be clear, this migration into the State of
Israel is not a “Right of Return” to areas of the Land of Israel which will be
included in the sovereign territory of the Palestinian state, a right that no one
disputes. In Israel, there is a broad consensus against this requirement for the
simple reason that accepting it will dramatically change the demographic
balance in Israel and question the legitimacy of Israel’s definition as a Jewish
nation-state.150
The Palestinian aspiration to move a massive Palestinian wave of
immigration into Israel has already been partially realized. Immediately after the
signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements,151 a large wave of Palestinians began moving from Gaza and the
West Bank into the Green Line.152 Over a period of approximately eight years,
about 140,000 Palestinians immigrated to Israel, most of them via a “family
reunification” rule enshrined in Israel’s immigration laws.153 These immigrants
joined the Israeli citizens who belong to the Palestinian minority.154 Only in
2002 did Israel begin to limit the immigration; allowing the immigration to
continue would have undermined the justification of the definition of Israel as

148 See, e.g., Ben Birnbaum & Amir Tibon, The Explosive, Inside Story of How John Kerry Built an IsraelPalestine Peace Plan—and Watched It Crumble, NEW REPUBLIC (July 20, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/118751/how-israel-palestine-peace-deal-died; Daniel Meir-Levi, 31 Opportunities for Statehood
Squandered in Favor of Genocide, FRONTPAGE MAG (July 14, 2011), http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/
98517/31-opportunities-statehood-squandered-favor-david-meir-levi.
149 See, e.g., The Democratic Constitution: Draft, ADALAH (Mar. 20, 2007), https://www.adalah.org/
uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/democratic_constitution-english.pdf.
150 See, e.g., Na’ama Carmi, Immigration Policy: Between Demographic Considerations and Preservation
of Culture, 2 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 14, 22, 25, 29 (2008); see also CHAIM GANS, A JUST ZIONISM: ON THE
MORALITY OF THE JEWISH STATE 84–93, 132-33 (2008); GAVISON, supra note 49, at 33–34.
151 See The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, KNESSET (Sept. 13, 1993),
www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/oslo_eng.htm.
152 Information provided by the then Deputy Attorney General, Meni Mazuz, in a discussion of the
Knesset’s Interior Committee on July 14, 2003, on the proposed Temporary Provision Law,
www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/data/html/pnim/2003-07-14-01.html (Hebrew).
153 Id.
154 Id. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2013, Arabs constitute 20.6% of the Israeli
population. See Press Release, Selected Data from the New Statistical Abstract of Israel No. 64-2013, CENT.
BUREAU STATISTICS (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template_eng.html?
hodaa=201311255.
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the Jewish nation-state,155 although this restriction was actually justified on
security grounds and not due to demographic reasons.156
The circumstances described have a double implication. First, they show that
the two prerequisites we set out above as conditions for recognizing the special
status of the Palestinian minority in Israel as part of an official immigration
policy are not met in this case.157 Second, they provide an independent
justification for the Law of Return, in addition to the justifications described
above.158 In a reality in which the legitimacy of the definition of Israel as a
Jewish nation-state is constantly being questioned—a reality in which demands
are openly made to erode the Jewish majority in a way that would weaken the
existence of the demographic prerequisite to justify the national character of
Israel—it is logical and morally justifiable for Israel to continue its attempt to
tilt the demographic balance back in favor of the Jewish side by means of a
preferential immigration policy toward the Jewish diaspora.
E. Conversion and Ethnicity
Setting criteria for immigration is a common practice in all Western
countries.159 Yet another criticism of the Law of Return is based on the argument
that it is not right for the law to distinguish the way it does, allegedly on
problematic racial and ethnic criteria.160 In the international human rights
discourse, such criteria are contested because they are neither self-selected nor
are they subject to modification.161 It is relevant to point out that international
155

Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision), 5763-2003, SH No. 1901 p. 544 (Isr.).
See BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 494.
157 Michael Omer-Man, This Week in History: Jewish Right to Aliya Becomes Law, JERUSALEM POST (July
8, 2011).
158 See id.
159 See Jennifer L. Hochschild & John Mollenkopf¸ The Complexities of Immigration: Why Western
Countries Struggle with Immigration Politics and Policies, in DELIVERING CITIZENSHIP (Bertelsmann Stifung,
European Policy Centre, Migration Policy Institute eds., 2009).
160 See Roselle Tekiner, Jewish Nationality Status as the Basis for Institutionalized Discrimination in Israel,
MIDDLE EAST POL’Y COUNCIL (1986), http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/jewish-nationalitystatus-basis-institutionalized-racial-discrimination-israel?print.
161 Orgad & Ruthizer, supra note 96, at 268–69. As Orgad and Ruthizer point out:
156

Applying international human rights law to an immigration context is not an easy task. First,
international law norms are not always enforceable in domestic law. In the United States, for
example, individuals do not have self-executing rights not to be discriminated against based on
international conventions. Second, article 1(2) to the CERD makes clear that it does not apply to
distinctions between “citizens and non-citizens.” Third, article 1(3) to the CERD provides that it
should not be interpreted in any way to deprive States Parties’ power on issues of “nationality” and
“citizenship or naturalization,” provided that the policies “do not discriminate against any
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law specifically excludes immigration policies from the general prohibition
against differentiation based on racial and ethnic criteria.162 Article 1(1) of the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination provides that:
“racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.163

While this is possibly the broadest definition of racial discrimination,164 it does
not include religion. Critics argue that such immigration policies are nonetheless
repugnant from a moral standpoint.165
The fact of the matter is that the premise on which the Law of Return
operates, whether on racial and/or ethnic distinctions, is not self-evident. Indeed,
while “belonging” to the Jewish people is a prerequisite for application of the
Law of Return, this “belonging” is demonstrably not contingent on racial or
ethnic factors.166 Any person, regardless of race or ethnicity, is able to join the
Jewish people, even if genealogically he or she has not a single drop of Jewish

particular nationality.” In interpreting this clause, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination has recalled that discrimination occurs only if the criteria “are not applied pursuant
to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.” That is, racial
discrimination may be permissible under the CERD after fulfilling some conditions. Indeed, the
International Court of Justice held that “international law leaves it to each State to lay down the
rules governing the grant of its nationality.” Fourth, article 1(1) to the CERD defines racial
discrimination only when it comes to discrimination of “human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
As Professor Legomsky noted, the question whether entry and access to citizenship have become
“human rights and fundamental freedoms,” which fall under the CERD’s definition, is at least
controversial. And lastly, it is doubtful whether admission criteria fall under the protection of the
CERD. International treaties usually apply within the state territory, or to people subjecting to its
jurisdiction. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that under “international law, the
jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial,” and that treaties are not “designed to
be applied throughout the world.
162 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1(3), Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
163 Id. art. 1(1).
164 KRISTIN HENRARD, DEVISING AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF MINORITY PROTECTION: INDIVIDUAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION 197 (2000).
165 See Louis Henkin, An Immigration Policy for a Just Society?, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 1017, 1018–19
(1994). See generally, Tekiner, supra note 160.
166 See Clayman, supra note 14.
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blood in his or her veins.167 Under these circumstances, it is not clear at all that
the aforementioned moral objection to the Law of Return should even be taken
into consideration.168
By way of response, one could argue that, although the option for acquiring
the Right of Return through conversion does not infringe on the right to equality
because it is not based on ethnic criteria, it still infringes on another right—the
freedom of religion—because joining the Jewish people involves joining the
Jewish religion.169
However, the right to freedom of religion is not affected in this case for two
reasons. First, religious freedom is customarily understood to protect a person
from being forced or coerced into actions that are against his or her religious
conscience.170 Here, no one is forced to convert to Judaism; in fact, no one is
even encouraged to take this step.171 An interpretation of freedom of religion
that would include within it a prohibition of the above-mentioned practice is, in
our opinion, undesirable in that it makes any benefit that is contingent on some
religious affiliation suspect from the perspective of religion and conscience.
Second, even if we adopt this broad interpretation of freedom of religion, it
is still doubtful that conversion-based conditions imposed on the application of
the Law of Return would be considered an affront to the freedom of religion.
The conversion that is required to trigger the benefits of the Law of Return is not
of a religious nature in the strict sense of the term.
To clarify this point, we return to the historical review of the Law of Return
that we described earlier in Part I. As explained, while the amendment to the
Law of Return did define who is a Jew, it left open the question of which
conversions shall be deemed to comply with the Law. This gave rise to an
ongoing dispute between the different streams of Judaism. On one side, the
Orthodox demand exclusive rights to conversion. On the other, the more liberal

167 OT/Jewish Bibl Bamidbar: Numbers ch. 9 v. 14. (“One statute shall apply to you, to the proselyte and
to the native-born citizen.”).
168 See What is the Difference between Race and Ethnicity?, LIVE SCIENCE (May 9, 2012), https://www.
livescience.com/33903-difference-race-ethnicity.html.
169 HCJ 2597/99 Rodriguez-Tushbeim v. Minister of Interior 59(6) PD 267, 280 (2005) (Isr.) (“Conversion
is a religious concept. It invokes an act ‘of taking upon oneself the burden of Judaism and joining the Jewish
People.’”) (citing HCJ 487/71 Clark v. Minister of Interior).
170 See Gideon Sapir & Daniel Statman, Why Freedom of Religion Does Not Include Freedom from
Religion, 24 L. & PHIL. 467, 475 (2005).
171 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD: TRACTATE YEVAMOTH, Folio 47(a).
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streams seek recognition of their conversions, too.172 We also noted that, in
2005, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled on this dispute and determined that, for
the purposes of the Law of Return, the State was required to recognize any
conversion carried out in a recognized Jewish community abroad by any one of
the mainstream Jewish denominations.173
Since 1893, the official position of the Central Conference of American
Rabbis (CCAR), the rabbinic umbrella organization of the Reform movement,
has been that it is lawful and proper for any officiating rabbi, assisted by no
fewer than two associates, “to accept into the sacred covenant of Israel . . . any
honorable and intelligent person . . . without any initiatory rite, ceremony, or
observance whatever . . . .”174 Unlike the immigration oaths of countries like
Hungary, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Singapore,175 the conversion
process to Reform Judaism does not even require a single mention of God.176
Instead, like in the immigration processes of the United States and the United
Kingdom, people can choose whether or not to mention God.177
Note that we express no opinion here on the validity of reform conversion.178
All we claim is that the process can be classified as more cultural than religious
in the conventional sense of the word “religious.” If we are correct, then from a
legal standpoint, the Law of Return provides for every single person the
possibility to immigrate to Israel, provided that they accept and establish a clear
link to the cultural characteristics of the State. Such a demand should be
acceptable even to those who are most careful about the moral obligation to
avoid discrimination on racial, ethnic, or even religious grounds.

172 See Shachar, supra note 25, at 244–48 (discussing the various definitions that were put forth by both the
Orthodox and liberal factions in Israel prior to the adoption of the Amendment to the Right of Return’s official
definition).
173 HCJ 2597/99 Rodriguez-Tushbeim v. Minister of Interior 59(6) PD 267, 280 (2005) (Isr.).
174 David Philipson, Kaufmann Kohler & H. Pereira Mendes, The Declaration of the Conference on the
Admission of Proselytes, Adopted at the New York Meeting in 1892, JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.
jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/4592-conferences-rabbinical (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
175 See 1993 Art. 7(4) Hungarian Citizenship Act (Act 55 of 1993); Citizenship Act 1977, sch 1 (N.Z.);
Commonwealth Act Rep. Act No. 473, § 12 (June 17, 1939) (Phil.); Oath of Renunciation, Allegiance and
Loyalty, Second Schedule of the Singapore Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
176 Uriel Heilman, Conversion to Judaism: Denomination to Denomination, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.jta.org/2014/10/06/life-religion/conversion-to-judaism-denomination-by-denomination/3.
177 See, e.g., British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, § 5(1) (“I, [name], [swear by Almighty God] [do solemnly,
sincerely and truly affirm and declare] that, on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, her heirs, and successors, according to law.”) (2008). In the United
States, “God” is in the standard text, but one can choose to omit it.
178 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2008).
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While the use of racial immigration classifications is not clearly
impermissible under international law, the use of cultural and nationality-based
restrictions seems to be explicitly permissible. As Orgad and Ruthizer note:
[I]n 1984, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that
preferences in naturalization criteria issued by Costa Rica for nationals
of Central American countries, Spaniards and Ibero-Americans is
compatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and
presents no case of discrimination. . . . The Court justified granting
preferences for Central American nationals by noting that they are
“closer historical, cultural and spiritual bonds with the people of Costa
Rica . . . [Central American nationals will] identify more readily with
the traditional beliefs, values and institutions of Costa Rica, which the
state has the right and duty to preserve.” Similarly, the European Court
of Human Rights upheld nationality-based distinctions when there is
“an objective and reasonable justification” in such a policy.179

Such, as we shall demonstrate, is the case for Israel and the Law of Return.
III. THE CONTEXTUAL ARGUMENT
A. The Argument
Having established that such a law is theoretically permissible, perhaps on
the grounds of cultural preservation, we now examine the Law of Return in
practice. To review, the Law of Return grants Jewish people an unconditional
right to immigrate to Israel and become citizens.180 While the Israeli populous
nearly unanimously supported the Law of Return in the past, the consensus
among the Jewish majority in recent years has been somewhat tempered with
those who want to completely eliminate the Right of Return and those who seek
only to qualify it. 181 In this section, we will first describe the various arguments
against the current arrangement, then evaluate and respond to them.
While it is correct that respect for the right to culture indeed requires nationstates to grant to the members of the nation living in the diaspora an
unconditional right to immigrate, this right is limited in time. Once a person is

179
180
181

Orgad & Ruthizer, supra note 96, at 269–70 (2010).
See Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13.
See generally Altschul, supra note 18, at 1367.
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granted the right to immigrate to his nation-state and does not realize it, the right
expires and he can no longer automatically claim to uphold it.182
Additionally, many immigrants today are not identified in any significant
way with the Jewish people, its culture, or its destiny; therefore, the main reason,
and sometimes the only reason, for their wish to immigrate to Israel is the desire
to improve their standard of living.183 As a result, so the argument goes, these
applicants cannot base their applications to immigrate to Israel on the right to
culture; thus, the State of Israel may (and perhaps should) deny them the
automatic right to immigrate to Israel and avoid favoring them over other
immigration applicants.184
Yet another consideration mentioned in this context is the effect the
migration of these people will have on Israel’s cultural identity.185 If many of
those eligible through the Law of Return are not culturally identified with the
Jewish nation, some of whom even have an alternative cultural identity, their
immigration to Israel would actually dilute and weaken the Jewish cultural
identity of Israel, which contrasts with the interests of the Jewish majority.186
Finally, today, the Jewish people in most parts of the world are not exposed
to persecution, and their status in their home countries is strong, unlike the
situation in the first years of the State.187 This relies upon the premise that during
the early years of the State, the majority of the immigrants were either survivors
of the crematoriums—persons who could not or did not want to return to their
home countries—or refugees from Arab countries who were persecuted in their
own lands because of their Jewish identity. Contrarily, many immigrants today
have not experienced special difficulties on the basis of their nationality.188 This
claim then seeks to deny the relevance of the alleged justification on the basis of
persecution.

182 See NA’AMA CARMI, IMMIGRATION AND THE LAW OF RETURN: IMMIGRATION RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS
53–55 (2003); Asa Kasher, Justice and Affirmative Action: Naturalization and the Law of Return, 15 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 101, 112 (1985).
183 See Carmi, supra note 150, at 29.
184 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 62–64.
185 See Carmi, supra note 150, at 33.
186 Id. at 69, 111.
187 See, e.g., Shachar, supra note 25.
188 See id. (quoting DON PERETZ & GIDEON DORON, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF ISRAEL 62 (3d ed.
1997)).

SAPIR_GOLDFEDER GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

2/1/2018 2:59 PM

LAW, RELIGION, AND IMMIGRATION

235

B. Discussion
1. The Right of Return as an Identity Characterizer
Below, we will discuss the various arguments cited for a call to reform the
immigration policy. But before we do that, we would like to stress an important
fact, which is relevant to the normative discussion.
As mentioned above, two groups exist among those seeking to reform the
immigration policy: those who propose to eliminate the preference given to the
Jewish people and those who offer to maintain the preference but seek to cancel
the automatic right, which would effectively expand the State’s discretion and
allow it to set conditions for the absorption of Jewish immigrants and the
subsequent granting of citizenship.189 The second proposal is consistent with the
migration arrangements in many nation-states that give preference to national
diasporas in their migration arrangements but retain the right to set additional
criteria and to exercise discretion within the framework of the decision on
whether to accept migration applicants even if they belong to the preferred
national group.190 Thus, at least from a comparative perspective, the proposal to
switch from a policy of granting an automatic right to a policy of a contingent
preference is not far-reaching. However, in circumstances unique to Israel, it is
still no less than a revolution—one that could significantly change the identity
of Israel.
During the Knesset debate on the eve of passing of the Law of Return, Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion said the following:
The Law of Return recognizes our country’s major purpose, the
purpose of ingathering of the exiles. This law stipulates that it is not
the state that gives the diaspora Jews the right to settle in it, rather this
right is inherent in every Jew as a Jew . . . this right predates the State
of Israel and it is it that built the state. The origin of this right is in the
historical connection that never stopped between the people and the
homeland.191

189

See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 14.
For a further discussion of European states with similar considerations, such as Germany, Greece, and
Ireland, see YAKOBSON & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 49, at 126–131.
191 DK (1950) 5032 (Isr.). See generally Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the
Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, supra note 50.
190
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In legal terms, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion sought to explain that the Law of
Return is not a constitutive law that creates the right of Jews to return to Israel,
but rather a declarative law, merely stating the existence of this right.192
This position of Ben-Gurion—that the immigration of Jews to Israel is based
on the inherent right of every Jew in the world and not, as it is usually
understood, on a benefit conferred by the State of Israel—has enjoyed a broad
consensus among members of the Knesset. Based on this premise, there were
Knesset members who opposed including in the Law any restrictions that would
limit the entry of Jews in some cases.193 In the end, it was decided to include a
few restrictions in the law, but, as explained above, these restrictions were very
limited in scope.194
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s declaration did not remain empty rhetoric. It
has withstood the test of reality and has dictated the immigration absorption
policy of the State of Israel since its inception. During Israel’s early years, a
large number of refugees were absorbed; in the thirty months between the
Proclamation of Statehood and the middle of 1951, more than half a million Jews
made Aliyah at a rate of 15,000–20,000 Olim (returners) per month.195 Thus,
over the course of the first three years of the country’s existence, the Jewish
population in the country doubled.196 The state barely restricted the flow of
immigrants, despite the fact that it imposed a very heavy burden on the country’s
economy and reshaped the structure of Israeli society.197
The government and the public in Israel showed a similar commitment in the
1990s when, over the course of several years, the country absorbed roughly one
million immigrants from the former Soviet Union.198 Israel’s economic situation
was far better, and the number of its citizens was much larger then, but even

192 See generally Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature Seeks to
Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, supra note 50.
193 DK (1950) 2044 (Isr.).
194 See Clayman, supra note 14.
195 Shoshana Neuman, Aliyah to Israel: Immigration under Conditions of Adversity 2 (Institute for the Study
of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 89, 1999).
196 A. BEIN, ALIYAH AND SETTLEMENT IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL (1982) [Hebrew] 46–47; DVORA HAKOHEN,
IMMIGRANTS IN TURMOIL: MASS IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS IN THE 1950S AND AFTER
(2003).
197 HAKOHEN, supra note 196, at 251–63.
198 Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Da Aliyah // Two Decades On, Wave of Russian Immigration to Israel Is
an Outstanding Success, HAARETZ (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/features/.premium-1.566484.
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here, the absorption of the immigrants demanded great effort and brought about
significant change in the social structure of the State.199
Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the commitment, rhetorical
and practical, of Israel’s unconditional absorption of Jewish immigration as one
of the most important and defining elements of the country’s national identity.
Even if canceling this commitment would correspond with the dominant trend
among nation-states, in the Israeli context, it would at least mean giving up one
of the most fundamental and identity-building characteristics of the State.
2. The Question of Time and Motivation
The first argument in favor of narrowing the automatic Right of Return is
based on the long amount of time that has passed since the establishment of the
State of Israel.200 The reasoning is that, even if we recognize the right of one to
immigrate to the State of his nationality, it is legitimate and even required to
limit this right in time.201 This is a weak prima facie argument since human
rights—particularly personal and fundamental ones—are never limited in
time.202 For example, it is inconceivable to think that a person who has not
expressed himself regarding a certain matter at the first opportunity would lose
his freedom of speech on the matter at some later date.
One could say that, in this case, the elapsed time does not negate the
existence of the right to immigrate—it only serves as an indication that the
conditions for its existence are not realized. As noted, the right to immigrate to
a nation-state is based on the recognition of the individual’s interest to live in a
cultural-political framework best suited to one’s cultural identity. It is possible,
then, to claim that the fact that a person avoided immigrating to his nation-state
for a long time, although it was possible, shows that his decision to immigrate
now is not based on the interest in question, and therefore he has no vested right
to that. We are of the opinion, however, that such a conclusion completely
ignores the complexity of the human existence. Life’s realities change
frequently, and people change, develop, and mature over the course of their
lives. Change in a person’s conduct may arise from differing circumstances or
shifting priorities, and the fact that a given individual did not exercise his or her
199

YAKOBSON & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 49, at 175.
See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 55–56.
201 See id. at 46.
202 Human Rights Principles, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/resources/
human-rights-principles (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
200
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right to immigrate in the past cannot teach us anything about his or her motives
now when he or she is asking to realize this right. Moreover, even if we accept
the above, it is at most only relevant to adult immigration applicants who have
had a real opportunity to immigrate. We cannot raise it with regard to youths or
anyone else who may wish to immigrate to Israel but have not yet had a realistic
chance to try.
It is also interesting to evaluate the normative premise behind the evidential
argument we rejected. The assumption is that it is not enough to be a formal
member in a particular nation to give a person the right to immigrate to the State
of that nation; seemingly, the feeling is that the right is reserved only to members
of the national group seeking to immigrate based on cultural-national motives.
This assumption has far-reaching significance well beyond the question of
whether it is legitimate to limit the time to exercise the right to immigrate. If we
adopt this assumption, it may justify (or perhaps even require) pre-screening all
applicants for immigration and accepting only those whose motives prove
suitable.
In theory, this might be a justified claim. As noted, the right to immigrate to
the nation-state derives from the right to self-determination.203 The main
justification for the right to self-determination is the justification of the right to
culture.204 If one’s wish to immigrate to one’s nation-state is not based on one’s
recognized interest in preserving and strengthening one’s cultural identity, he
cannot make use of the justification from the right to culture, and therefore
cannot claim for himself the right to automatic immigration.
In practice, however, how does one determine the motives for immigration?
It is quite difficult to discover the motivations of immigration applicants.205 In
fact, it is much more effective to use an objective test to gauge the degree of
association of an immigration applicant to his national culture, as some countries
already do. In this context, we can examine data like the fluency of the
immigration applicant in the national language, a basic knowledge of national
history, and, in the case where the nation is traditionally identified with a
particular religion, even familiarity with basic elements of that religion.206
203

See supra Part II(B).
Id.
205 For example, while some motivations may be serious, such as escaping persecution, others may be
frivolous. See David Kilimnick, 18 Reasons for Making Aliyah, AISH.COM, http://www.aish.com/j/f/18Reasons-for-Making-Aliyah.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
206 Id. See Amitai Etzioni, Citizenship Tests: A Comparative, Communitarian Perspective, 78 POL. Q. 353–
63 (2007); Ariel Loring, The Meaning of Citizenship: Tests, Policy, and English Proficiency, 24 CATESOL J.
204
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Indeed, many nation-states that give priority to immigration applicants from
their national diaspora pose such tests as a prerequisite for granting the right to
immigrate.207 Of course, you can connect these prerequisites to the interests of
nation-states, the desire to ensure that immigration applicants will be culturally
absorbed and that the cultural element that unites the State’s citizens will not
weaken due to the absorption of unsuitable immigration applicants.208 However,
the placing of these conditions can also be explained as stemming from the basic
assumption that the right to immigrate is only given to those who need it in order
to strengthen their own cultural identity.
3. The Question of National Interest
On a related note, giving preference to the people of one nation in
immigration can be based not only on the right of the migration applicants, but
also on the interest of the members of the majority group in the state to
strengthen their national culture.209 As noted earlier in this article, some argue
that in terms of policy, the current arrangements in the Law of Return do not
serve this interest, and in fact, the arrangements run counter to and harm it.210
Critics point out that even if in the past the majority of the immigrants who came
to Israel under the Law of Return had a clear Jewish identity, and the desire to
immigrate was due, among other reasons, to cultural-national reasons, currently
many immigrants are not culturally identified with the Jewish nation at all, and
their immigration stems from a desire to simply improve their standard of
living.211 In this reality, the Law of Return does not strengthen the Jewish
identity of Israel, but harms it. Below, we will examine this argument.

198 (2012), http://www.catesoljournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/cj24_loring.pdf; Bridge Byrne, Testing
Times: The Place of the Citizenship Test in the UK Immigration Regime and New Citizens’ Responses to It, SAGE
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://soc.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/02/02/0038038515622908.full; Want Citizenship?
Take the Spanish Culture Test, LOCAL (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.thelocal.es/20140423/immigrants-sitlanguage-test-exam-immigration-spain-gallardon.
207 For example, according to Article 16 of the Law on Croatian Citizenship, it is possible to acquire
Croatian citizenship if you are “[a] person who belongs to the Croatian people with no domicile in the Republic
of Croatia,” but you still need to fulfill the requirements of Article 8.5—“that it can be concluded from his
behavior that he respects the legal order and customs of the Republic of Croatia.”
208 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 69.
209 Etzioni, supra note 206, at 353.
210 See generally Altschul, supra note 18, at 1346-47; HAZONY, supra note 23.
211 See generally Carmi, supra note 150.
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a. The Nature of Immigration in Recent Years
Today, the relative weight of immigrants lacking a cultural affinity to the
Jewish people in the general immigrant population is heavier than its relative
weight in the past.212 The difference is due to two main reasons. The first is the
improvement in the general economic situation and the security of Israel.213
During the first decades of Israel’s existence, a real existential threat was present
and always felt.214 Today, the situation is somewhat different. While Israel still
faces complex security challenges, Israel’s military is powerful and effective and
Israel has many means at its disposal that reinforce its deterrent capability.215
The general feeling is that if no massive use of non-conventional weapons is
launched against it (i.e., as in the threat posed to it by Iran), Israel’s very
existence is not under immediate threat.216
Israel’s economic situation is firm, too.217 Despite the fact that, throughout
its existence, Israel has been forced to devote a large portion of its budget to
212

Changing Patterns of Global Migration and Remittances, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/17/changing-patterns-of-global-migration-and-remittances/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2017); International Migrants by Country, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/
migration-tables/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); U.S. Immigration Trends, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/us-immigration-trends#source (last visited Nov. 17, 2017);
Vital Statistics: Latest Population Statistics for Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/latest-population-statistics-for-israel (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). Increased earlier rise
of Jewish immigration was caused by:
[T]hree large spurts associated with upheavals outside the country: the rise of Nazism in the 1930s;
the immigration of displaced persons from Europe and from Muslim countries in the years
immediately following the establishment of the state; and the mass movement of immigrants from
the former Soviet Union following the end of the Cold War.
Ian S. Lustick, Israel’s Migration Balance: Demography, Politics, and Ideology, 26 ISR. STUD. REV. 33,
34 (2011).
213 See, e.g., Economy, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/
Economy/Pages/ECONOMY.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); Israel, HERITAGE, http://www.heritage.org/
index/pdf/2017/countries/israel.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); Israel, WORLD ECON. FORUM, http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/GCR2013-14/Israel.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see also ILAN GOLDENBERG ET AL.,
ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE: A SECURITY SYSTEM FOR THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION (2016); GABRIEL SHEFFER &
OREN BARAK, ISRAEL’S SECURITY NETWORK 31–34 (2013); Daniel Bar-Tal, Tamir Magal & Eran Halperin, The
Paradox of Security Views in Israel: A Social Psychological Explanation, in EXISTENTIAL THREATS AND CIVILSECURITY RELATIONS 119–20 (Oren Barak & Gabriel Sheffer eds., 2009).
214 Bar-Tal, Magal & Halperin, supra note 213, at 120–25; COMMANDERS FOR ISRAEL’S SECURITY,
CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME: A PLAN TO IMPROVE ISRAEL’S SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STANDING
12 (2016).
215 YAAKOV KATZ, THE WEAPON WIZARDS 7 (2017); see also GOLDENBERG ET AL., supra note 213.
216 Guy Bechor, IDF Stronger Than Ever, YNETNEWS (Nov. 25, 2010), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
0,7340,L-3989257,00.html.
217 See Economy, supra note 213.
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defense measures and operations,218 and, unlike some of its neighbors, it has no
significant natural resources within its borders,219 the Israeli economy is stable,
its foreign currency reserves are high, and its national product per capita is
significantly higher than other Middle Eastern countries.220 Israel is considered
a high-tech superpower,221 and many technology companies have established
Research and Development centers in Israel.222 The economic crisis felt
throughout the Western countries in recent years was almost unnoticed in Israel,
and it is considered a legitimate member in the community of developed
countries.223 In light of the prosperity and the relative stability in security, it is
understandable why many eligible for return exercise their right to immigrate to
Israel even in the absence of a special relationship to Judaism or Jewish
culture.224
A second reason for the increase in immigration among people lacking an
affinity to Israel is tied to the history of the Jewish Diaspora in the Soviet Union
during the twentieth century and the amendments to the Law of Return of 1970
218 Israel comes second to only the United States in total defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Niall
McCarthy, The Biggest Military Budgets as a Percentage of GDP, FORBES (June 25, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/06/25/the-biggest-military-budgets-as-a-percentage-of-gdpinfographic-2/#6a1260094c47; see also Jordin S. Cohen et al., Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in
Israel: The Indirect Link, 33 J. PEACE RES. 341, 341 (1996) (“since the mid-1980s, Israel has been slashing its
defense budget while its economy has grown”); Military Expenditure (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=IL&start=1988&view=char
t (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (providing a breakdown of the percentage of gross domestic product spent on
defense between 1988 and 2015).
219 Sarah Bronson, List of Israel’s Natural Resources, USA TODAY, http://traveltips.usatoday.com/listisraels-natural-resources-63037.html. Recently, though, there have been offshore discoveries of natural gas,
recoverable oil, and scattered deposits of minerals that have potential for a “large and sophisticated chemicals
industry.” See, e.g., MINISTRY OF ENERGY, ISRAELI GAS OPPORTUNITIES (2015) (discussing the gas revolution
in Israel); Simon Henderson, Israel’s Natural Gas Challenges, THE WASHINGTON INST. (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israels-natural-gas-challenges; Shmuel Levin, A New
Milestone – Israel Begins Exporting Gas, AUSTRALIA/ISRAEL & JEWISH AFFAIRS COUNCIL (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://aijac.org.au/news/article/a-new-milestone-israel-begins-exporting-gas; Oren Liebermann, Big Gas Fields
Could Make Israel Energy Independent, CNN MONEY (May 26, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/26/news/
israel-gas-exports-energy-independence/; Israel’s Natural Resources, FACTS ABOUT ISRAEL, http://www.
factsaboutisrael.uk/israels-natural-resources/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
220 See Economy, supra note 213.
221 Beyond the Start-Up Nation, ECONOMIST (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17796932?
fsrc=scn/fb/wl/ar/beyondstartup.
222 Inbal Orpaz, Multinational R&D Emerges as Main Source of Israeli Innovation, HAARETZ (Aug. 8,
2013), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-1.540333.
223 Israel joined the OECD on Sept. 7, 2010.
224 For further discussion on the fact that Israel is currently considered by many to be a desirable destination
for immigration, see SHLOMO AVINERI, LIAV ORGAD & AMNON RUBINSTEIN, MANAGING GLOBAL MIGRATION:
A STRATEGY FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY IN ISRAEL (2010).
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that added family members of Jews to the circle of eligibility.225 After the
Holocaust that obliterated the majority of European Jews, most of the survivors
emigrated from the continent—some to Israel and some to other countries.226
With the establishment of the nation-state, a large immigration influx of Jews
from Arab countries took place because of the persecution that they had been
experiencing.227 These changes made the Jewish community in the Soviet Union
the second largest Jewish diaspora, after the United States.228 Since the time of
the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet government had consistently persecuted
religion in general—and the Jewish religion in particular.229 Additionally, during
the Cold War, the ties between Soviet Jews and the rest of the Jewish people
were severed.230 These two factors weakened the cultural affinity of Soviet Jews
to Judaism, as reflected, among other things, by a high rate of intermarriage.231
Taken together, the two amendments of 1970 created a somewhat
inconsistent arrangement: the new law defined a “Jew” for the purposes of
Return according to an almost religious definition, but, at the same time, it
expanded the extent of Aliyah eligibility to include the relatives of a Jew, even
if the eligible individuals are not connected to Judaism or to the Jewish people.232
On one hand, this expansion of eligibility to return significantly expanded the
number of those eligible to exercise the right of return in the Soviet Union.233
On the other hand, it diluted the relationship between most members of this
group and the Jewish people, a relationship that, as noted, was already weak after
so many years of persecution.234
Despite this reality, until the beginning of the 1990s, the immigration to
Israel from the Soviet Union was still of an ideological nature, partly because
the Soviet Union impeded the path of immigration applicants, and the Soviet
government persecuted and jailed many of those who wanted to immigrate to
Israel.235 Under these circumstances, the ones who insisted and sometimes
225

Beyond the Start-Up Nation, supra note 221.
See The Aftermath of the Holocaust, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/
article.php?ModuleId=10005129 (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
227 Ada Aharoni, The Forced Migration of Jews from Arab Countries, 15 PEACE REV. 53, 53 (2003).
228 Anatoly Vishnevsky, The Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Ethnic Migration; The Return
of Diasporas?, in DIASPORAS AND ETHNIC MIGRANTS 144 (Munz & Ohliger eds. 2005).
229 HARRY G. SHAFFER, THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF JEWS 8–24 (1974).
230 JONATHAN D. PORATH, JEWS IN RUSSIA 148 (1974).
231 See HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL 733–34 (2007).
232 Id. at 606–07.
233 See generally PORATH, supra note 230.
234 See generally SACHAR, supra note 231.
235 NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR NO EVIL (1998).
226
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managed to break through the Iron Curtain and immigrate to Israel were
primarily characterized by a strong Jewish consciousness and a desire to express
it.236 However, with the fall of the Communist Bloc, the gates of the Soviet
Union opened wide and a great wave of immigration began.237 A precarious
economic situation in the Soviet Union encouraged many who were eligible to
immigrate to try their luck in the Holy Land.238 In the first few years afterwards,
many of the immigrants who arrived still had some cultural affinity with
Judaism.239 At some point, while the main potential of ideological-cultural
immigration was exhausted, the number of immigrants with no Jewish affinity
grew.240
b. The Effect of the Change on the Nature of Israeli Society
The description of the change in nature of the immigration to Israel is indeed
relevant to clarify whether giving the right to unrestricted immigration is
consistent with the interests of the Jewish majority in the land. However, in our
opinion, using those numbers alone, one cannot reach a clear conclusion; there
is a real need to examine what happens to immigrants under the Law of Return
after they become Israeli citizens. Although an exhaustive research study has
not yet been conducted, the existing data indicates that an overwhelming
majority of immigrants to Israel still fit into the Jewish majority and adopt its
culture, even if not practicing its religion.241 This is true especially with regard

236 See Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin, Institutionalization of the Post-Communist Jewish Movement:
Organizational Structures, Ruling Elites, and Political Conflicts, 14 JEWISH POL. STUD. REV. (2002); see also
Maria Saleh, Former Soviet Union Immigrants: The Impact on Israel, Israeli Politics, and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict 1, http://ucollege.wustl.edu/files/ucollege/imce/iap_saleh.pdf (“first wave in the 1970s was largely a
result of Zionist conviction.”).
237 See, e.g., MARK TOLTS, POST-SOVIET ALIYAH AND JEWISH DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION (2009)
(offers statistical data for the emigration); 1989–2014: Russian-Speaking Jews 25 Years Later, JEWISH PEOPLE
POL’Y INST., http://jppi.org.il/uploads/Russian-Speaking_Jews_25_Years_Later.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
238 See Saleh, supra note 236, at 3 (“From its onset, immigrants were driven by fear and uncertainty
associated with the collapsing Soviet political system, the failing economy, and rising social and ethnic
tensions.”).
239 See generally LARISSA REMENNICK, RUSSIAN JEWS ON THREE CONTINENTS: IDENTITY, INTEGRATION,
AND CONFLICT (2012).
240 See Theodore Friedgut, Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU): Their Influence and Identity,
in ISRAEL IDENTITY IN TRANSITION 185–214 (Anita Shapira ed., 2004); Yfaat Weiss, The Golem and Its Creator:
Or How the Jewish Nation State Became Multi Ethnic, in CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP 82–103 (Yfaat
Weiss and & Daniel Levy eds., 2002).
241 See, e.g., Asher Cohen & Bernard Susser, Jews and Others: Non-Jewish Jews in Israel, 15 ISR. AFF. 1,
52–65 (2009); Yakobson, Joining the Jewish People: Non-Jewish Immigrants from the Former USSR, Israeli
Identity and Jewish Peoplehood, supra note 29, at 226–27 (arguing that regardless of formal definitions, these
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to those who immigrated at a young age and with regard to the second generation
of the immigrant families.242 The difference between younger and older
immigrants regarding integration is natural and familiar in all countries that
absorb immigration, but is particularly evident in Israel. Israel has a lengthy
mandatory military service.243 The service, which involves intensive exposure
to the Jewish-Israeli culture and contribution to the society and the nation,
strengthens the affinity of the immigrants and of the second generation to Israel
and to the Jewish people.244 In addition, the Israeli military invests considerable
time and effort to expose the immigrant soldiers to the national culture and the
Jewish religion, even helping those interested to go through the conversion
process.245
If, over time, a considerable number of immigrants did avoid being
integrated into the Jewish society and culture, it might strengthen the argument
that the provision of an unconditional right to immigration is against the interests
of the Jewish majority.246 However, once it becomes clear that most immigrants
eventually integrate into the Jewish-Israeli culture, the argument that the main
interest of the Jewish majority is to strengthen and preserve its culture is
weakened. This weakening is directly due to the automatic absorption of
immigrants under the Law of Return.247

immigrants, through their successful social and cultural integration in the Hebrew-speaking Jewish society in
Israel, are joining, de facto, the Jewish people).
242 See Yakobson, Joining the Jewish People: Non-Jewish Immigrants from the Former USSR, Israeli
Identity and Jewish Peoplehood, supra note 29, at 224, 228; see also Revital Blumenfeld, Study: Children of
Soviet Immigrants Fully Assimilated into Israeli Society, HAARETZ (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/study-children-of-soviet-immigrants-fully-assimilated-into-israeli-society-1.403749.
243 Security Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, §§ 13, 15 (Isr.).
244 See Yakobson, Joining the Jewish People: Non-Jewish Immigrants from the Former USSR, Israeli
Identity and Jewish Peoplehood, supra note 29, at 232, n. 29; see also Joshua Mitnick, The Israel Defense
Forces, MY JEWISH LEARNING, http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/the-israel-defense-forces/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2017).
245 This project is called NATIV, which is a branch of the Jewish Studies Institute—the official authority
for pre-converting studies. During their military service, soldiers can join the course of Jewish studies. At the
end of the course—after seven to ten weeks—soldiers who are interested will continue to a conversion process,
accompanied by the course staff. Anshel Pfeffer, IDF Program Quietly Carries Out Nearly Half Israel’s
Conversions, HAARETZ (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.haaretz.com/news/idf-program-quietly-carries-out-nearlyhalf-israel-s-conversions-1.230299.
246 See generally Sammy Smooha, The Mass Immigrations to Israel: A Comparison of the Failure of the
Mizrahi Immigrants of the 1950s with the Success of the Russian Immigrants of the 1990s, 27 J. ISRAELI HIST.
1, 21 (2008), http://soc.haifa.ac.il/~s.smooha/download/Mass_Immigrations_to_Israel.pdf.
247 See generally Christian Joppke & Zeev Roshenhek, Ethnic-Priority Immigration in Israel and Germany:
Resilience Versus Demise, CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION STUD. (Dec. 2001), https://ccis.ucsd.edu/_
files/wp45.pdf.
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Another indication that the massive absorption of immigrants lacking a
strong affinity to Judaism does not harm the Jewish cultural identity of the Israeli
society can be found in the fact that public opinion polls conducted in Israel
every few years show that, in general, the cultural-national identity of Israeli
Jews has become stronger over time.248
c. The National Interest Against Changing the Law
The data provided thus far show that granting unrestricted immigration rights
to Diaspora Jewry is not contrary to the interest of the Jewish majority in
Israel.249 Below, we will describe a number of considerations that establish the
much stronger claim that granting an unconditional immigration right coincides
with the Jewish interest.
The existence of a solid majority of members of a nationality group in a
specific territory is a prerequisite for recognizing their right to self-determination
in this territory.250 In the Israeli-Palestinian context, the demographic aspect has
a special weight both in the debate about the future of the territories and within
the framework of the immigration policy debate in Israel regarding Palestinians
living in the Palestinian territories and in Arab countries. As we explained, the
Jewish identity of Israel within the Green Line is not a self-evident reality for
several reasons, including: the attempt of many Palestinians to immigrate to
Israel;251 the demand of the Palestinian leadership to give the descendants of the
refugees a right of return to the Green Line;252 and the refusal of the leadership
of the Palestinian minority in Israel to accept the Jewish identity of Israel.253
Under these circumstances, the Jewish majority in Israel likely has a particularly
strong interest in establishing, reinforcing, and expanding its numerical
dominance. One of the effective ways to achieve this goal would be to
significantly increase absorption.254 As long as most immigrants eventually join
248 ASHER ARIAN & AYALA KEISSAR-SUGARMEN, A PORTRAIT OF ISRAELI JEWS: BELIEF, OBSERVANCE AND
VALUES OF ISRAELI JEWS (2009) (finding stronger affinity to Jewish identity in 2009 in comparison to 1991, the
year of massive Aliya from the USSR).
249 See supra Part III(B)(1)–(3)(b).
250 See supra Part II(B); Allison Beth Hodgkins, Beyond Two-States: Alternative Visions of SelfDetermination for the People of Palestine, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 109, 123 (2004).
251 See generally Ephraim Tabory, Jewish Identity, Jewish Nationalism, and Soviet Jewish Migration, 33 J.
CHURCH & ST. 287 (1991).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See Lidar Gravé-Lazi, A New Tool to Foster Jewish Identity in the Diaspora: Israel Education,
JERUSALEM POST (Jul. 10, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Israeli-education-A-new-tool-to-fosteridentification-with-both-Jewish-state-Judaism-362181.
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the Jewish majority, the goal is achieved, even if some of them were not
culturally identified as Jews upon arrival.255 Placing significant restrictions on
the automatic right to immigrate to Israel will inevitably lead to a significant
decrease in the volume of immigration and would harm the long-term Jewish
interest to strengthen its numerical dominance in Israel.256
Placing restrictions on Jews’ right to immigrate to Israel is contrary to the
Israeli interest for an additional reason. The State of Israel maintains a strong
relationship with the Diaspora for the benefit of both sides. Israel is a central
identity element in the self-definition of Diaspora Jews and serves as a source of
pride for many of them.257 On their end, Diaspora Jews provide Israel with a lot
of financial and political support.258 The affinity between Israel and the Jewish
Diaspora is based, in part, on the premise that every Jew has the right to become
a citizen of Israel, which he or she can exercise at will. This grants every Jewish
person, wherever they may be, the secure feeling that there is always a
welcoming home—even away from home.259An erosion of this right will not
end the relationship between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora, but it will certainly
weaken the mutual commitment, which Israel’s Jewish majority group has a
strong interest in maintaining and cultivating.
d. If We Do Need to Limit, Who Should Be Limited?
So far, we have explained why Israel’s national interest does not support
setting conditions on the right of automatic immigration granted in the Law of
Return. However, in our opinion, there is a certain justice in the opposite claim
with regard to a particular group, which is described below.

255 Uzi Rebhun & Gilad Malach, Demographic Trends in Israel, THE METZILAH CTR. FOR ZIONIST, JEWISH,
LIBERAL AND HUMANIST THOUGHT, 1, 52 (Ruth Gavison ed., 2009).
256 Israel Ploys to Attract Migrants, Prevent Reverse Immigration, AWD NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://awdnews.com/political/israel-ploys-to-attract-migrants,-prevent-reverse-immigration.
257 Taglit-Birthright is a good example of the shared interest and effort undertaken by Israel and Diaspora.
The vision of this project is “[t]o strengthen each participant’s identity as a Jew; to build an understanding, a
friendship and a lasting bond with the land and people of Israel; and to reinforce the solidarity of the Jewish
people worldwide.” Because of this enterprise, about 50,000 Jewish students are visiting Israel every year.
Taglit-Birthright is funded both by philanthropists and the Government of Israel. About Birthright Israel, TAGLIT
BIRTHRIGHT ISRAEL, http://taglitww.birthrightisrael.com/TaglitBirthrightIsraelStory/Pages/default.aspxus (last
visited Nov. 17, 2017).
258 Eric Fleish & Theodore Sasson, The New Philanthropy: American Jewish Giving to Israeli
Organizations, COHEN CTR. FOR MOD. JEWISH STUD. 7–8 (2012), www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/pdfs/
TheNewPhilanthropy.pdf.
259 Jeffrey Goldberg, Is It Time for the Jews to Leave Europe?, THE ATLANTIC, https://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2015/04/is-it-time-for-the-jews-to-leave-europe/386279/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
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The Law of Return uses an ostensibly religious test for defining a Jew,
although it does not require immigration applicants to be religious Jews
according to the current definition of the concept.260 However, the law explicitly
denies the Right of Return from those who are formally defined as Jews but
belong to a different religion.261 Underlying this assertion is a position, probably
accepted by an overwhelming majority of the Jewish people—members of
various religious denominations as well as secular Jews—that joining another
religion revokes the Jewish national identity.262
If the Law of Return expressly excludes a member of a different religion
from the definition of a Jew for the purpose of determining eligibility to the
Right of Return, how is it possible that the same law grants a right to immigrate
to Israel to active members of other religions? The answer lies in Article 4A of
the Law of Return—the Amendment expanding the eligibility for spouses of
Jews and their descendants and their descendants’ spouses to a third
generation.263 All of these people are entitled to return, even if the Jew by whose
right they obtained the right to immigrate to Israel does not join them.264 Among
immigrants who came under this section, there are quite a few people who are
not only not considered Jewish under the Law of Return but also actively belong
to another religion.265
The expansion of the circle of people eligible to return through the 1970
Amendment was carried out as a complementary step to the restrictions of the
definition of a Jew in the same amendment.266 Supporters of the expansion
presented a number of justifications for the move. According to one explanation,
without this expansion of eligibility, many Jews would in effect be prevented
from exercising their right to immigrate to Israel since they would have to leave
some of their non-Jewish family behind.267 This argument assumes that, in the
260

Israel Ploys to Attract Migrants, Prevent Reverse Immigration, supra note 256.
Id.
262 See Rufeisen v. Minister of Interior, 16(4) PD 2428 (1962), reprinted in Special Volume SELECTED
JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, 1–35 (Asher Felix Landau & Peter Elman, eds., 1971); HCJ
72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of Interior 16(4) PD 2428 (1962). Rufeisen, who was born in Poland to a Jewish
family, became a Christian. Id. He wanted to have an Israeli citizenship by virtue of the Law of Return and was
refused, a decision that the Court confirmed later on. Id. The Court held that although he was Jewish according
to the Halacha, Rufeisen lost his Jewish identity in the Law of Return aspect by converting to Christianity. Id.
263 Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), supra note 65.
264 Id. at 4A(b).
265 See generally Mordecai Plaut, Should Non-Jews “Return” Under the Law of Return?, CHAREIDI,
http://www.chareidi.org/ATCOTU/snjrutlor.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
266 Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), supra note 65.
267 GAVISON, supra note 49, at 77.
261
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balancing test of social benefits, it is better to be over-inclusive. As stated by
another explanation, many people are considered Jewish in their own countries,
even though religiously they are not, and their self-identification as Jews resulted
in discrimination and persecution.268 If Israel refuses to open its gates to them,
they will be punished again.269 In this context, there were those who pointed to
the Nazi racial laws as a perverse and reverse inspiration.270 If the Nazis defined
a person as a Jew, despite the fact that his blood was “mixed blood,” then Israel
has the moral obligation to recognize such a person as a member of the Jewish
nation and allow him to immigrate to Israel.271
These considerations are serious and cannot be written off with the stroke of
a pen. However, it seems that, in the overall balance, a certain limitation on the
automatic right to immigration granted in Section 4A should be considered by
adding a restriction similar to that provided in the section defining a Jewish
person in the Law of Return.272 Just as a Jew by origin loses the automatic right
to immigrate to Israel if he is an active member of another religion, it is perhaps
appropriate to deny this right to Jewish descendants and their spouses to the third
generation if they are active members of another religion. This restriction is not
exclusively based on religious grounds, but uses religious affiliation as a
relatively reliable predictor (one that can be easily corrected, if the individual in
question wishes to convert) for the chance of integration of the immigration
applicant into the Israeli-Jewish culture.273 The State of Israel has an interest in
strengthening its Jewish cultural identity.274 Absorbing immigrants who are
active members of other religions not only fails to reinforce this interest, but it
also weakens this interest since it is highly likely that these immigrants will
constitute a foreign element in the Jewish-Israeli culture and may even help
establish an additional religious-cultural minority in Israel on top of the
indigenous minorities that are already living in the country.275
To be clear, we do not propose the cancellation of Article 4A of the Law of
Return. According to our proposal, many immigration applicants will continue
268 Nissim Leon, Secular Jews: From Proactive Agents to Defensive Players, 27 ISRAELI STUD. REV. 23,
21–26 (2012).
269 Id. at 27.
270 ASHER COHEN, JEWS NON-JEWISH: ISRAELI-JEWISH IDENTITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF EXPANSION THE
JEWISH NATION (2006) [Hebrew].
271 See id.
272 Nachon Perez, Israel's Law of Return: A Qualified Justification, 31 MOD. JUDAISM 59, 59.
273 See generally Plaut, supra note 265.
274 Yehuda Lav, The Integration Process in Israel, 1 ÖIF-DOSSIER 3, 3–36 (2009).
275 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 69.
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to receive an automatic right to immigration under their family attachment to
Jews. The door will be closed only to immigration applicants actively belonging
to another religion. The truth is that even this modest change is somewhat at
odds with the justifications for the arrangement of Article 4A described in this
section, which we do not believe have moral weight. Our proposal suggests that
we reduce this tension in two ways. First, it will not apply to members of other
religions if they immigrate to Israel together with the Jewish family member by
whose virtue they are eligible to immigrate. This should prevent the breaking up
of families and ensure that no one is left behind. Second, the limitation will not
apply to individuals or even the family members of “Jews” who are persecuted
because of their ties to the Jewish people. Therefore, we propose that members
of a Jewish family should be entitled to return under Article 4A, even if they are
active members of another religion, provided that they immigrate with their
Jewish family member or they show that they are persecuted in their country of
origin because of their affinity with the Jewish people.
4. The Relevance of the Justification Based on Persecution
On its face, the justification based on persecution depends on the existence
of a present or future danger to the wellbeing of members of the national group,
and it is not enough that such risk existed at some point in the past.276
Accordingly, there are those who argue that, in the reality of the 21st century,
this justification loses its validity in the Jewish-Israeli context since the Jews are
not persecuted for being Jewish anymore.277
Unfortunately, this claim is simply not true. Jews have been persecuted for
thousands of years, with varying ferocity, but they have never been granted a
refuge from anti-Semitism.278 The Holocaust marked an unprecedented low
point in Jewish and world history, and given its magnitude, the question arises
whether it can even be treated as just another point on the infinite continuum of
persecution against the Jews. But, there is no doubt that before and after the
Holocaust there were, and still are, periods and places where one’s Jewishness
served and serves as sufficient reason to justify murder or other forms of
persecution.279
276 THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY CONCEPT 226 (Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann &
Margaret Walton-Roberts eds., 2015).
277 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 43.
278 See The 2013 Top Ten Anti-Israel Groups in the U.S., supra note 31.
279 Eitan Na’eh, Jews Killed Simply for Being Jews, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/11929445/Jews-are-being-killed-simply-for-being-Jews.html.
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One hope nurtured by generations of leaders of the Zionist movement was
that the establishment of a Jewish State would lead to a normalization of the
Jewish people and thereby to the eradication of anti-Semitism.280 Sadly, their
hopes were dashed. Paradoxically, the establishment of the State of Israel not
only failed to result in the abolition of anti-Semitism, but it also provided antiSemitism a new cover in the form of the “anti-Israel” movement.281 Indeed, as
noted by a number of historians, anti-Semitism alters its shape over time and
place.282 Sometimes it has a religious nature, sometimes racial, sometimes
national, and, in recent decades, it has even found a new shape—the State of
Israel and the Zionist movement, which, in one of the lowest points in its history,
was defined by the United Nations as racist.283
Even now, the unfortunate reality of the hatred and persecution of Jews has
not disappeared from the world. Synagogues and Jewish community institutions
in many parts of the world, including European countries, look more like
fortified sites than houses of worship and civic institutions due to the amount of
defense measures that the community leaders are forced to employ.284 Blatant
anti-Semitism exists even in countries where there are hardly any more Jews to
hate after all of the murders and expulsions.285 Anti-Semitism is present both on
the surface and below, even in countries like the United States, where there is a
large and prosperous Jewish community and robust, benevolent government
protections.286
Is there a basis for hope that anti-Semitism will fade away in the near future?
Of course—the fight against hatred and prejudice is extremely important, and to
muster the strength to battle it, one always needs to find hope. But, it is also

280 The “Political Zionism” movement was led mainly by Theodore Herzl. See AMNON RUBENSTEIN, THE
ZIONIST DREAM REVISED 6 (1994).
281 Irwin Cotler, Identifying the New Anti-Semitism, AISH, http://www.aish.com/jw/s/48892472.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2017).
282 See ROBERT WISTRICH, A LETHAL OBSESSION: ANTI-SEMITISM FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE GLOBAL JIHAD
6–7 (2010).
283 G.A. Res. 3379 (XXX), Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Nov. 10, 1975)
(determining that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination).
284 Recently, a synagogue in Paris was severely attacked. See JTA, Anti-Israel Protesters Attack Paris
Synagogue, JERUSALEM POST (July 13, 2014, 11:36 PM) http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/
Anti-Israel-protesters-attack-Paris-synagogue-362643.
285 The ten most anti-Semitic countries are Arab states. See ADL Poll of Over 100 Countries Finds More
than One-Quarter of Those Surveyed Infected with Anti-Semitic Attitudes, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (May 13,
2004),
http://www.adl.org/press-center/press-releases/anti-semitism-international/adl-global-100-poll.html?
referrer=https://www.google.com/#.V-UknZMrLEY.
286 See The 2013 Top Ten Anti-Israel Groups in the U.S., supra note 31.
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important to look at reality with open eyes and be wary of confusing hope with
illusion. Recent nationalist and religious upheavals in the world apparently
refute declarations about the end of history.287 Unfortunately, they also refute
the assumption that Jewish persecution has reached the end of its long road.288
This reality makes it unnecessary to examine the question of “what would
happen if . . . ?” However, there is one normative point we want to stress—the
justification on the basis of persecution actually serves two functions: it
establishes the right of a persecuted people to a homeland generally and it
establishes the right of individuals of that persecuted people to immigrate to their
nation-state specifically.289 We agreed above that the validity of the justification
on the basis of persecution depends on the current risk to the safety of the
members of the national group. However, in our opinion, this point has to be
qualified. The requirement of current risk is relevant only as a condition for
establishing the right of the people to a nation-state (together with the
justification of the right to culture).290 It is not required as a condition for
establishing the right of individual members of a persecuted people to immigrate
to their nation-state.291 An individual member of a persecuted people is entitled
to immigrate to his nation-state under the justification of persecution, even if he
is not persecuted because of his national identity.292
The right to immigrate to a nation-state on the basis of persecution is not
only meant to protect just the life and property of a member of the persecuted
nationality but also his or her sense of security and well-being. When members
of one group of a particular nation are persecuted because of their nationality, it
has a severe psychological impact on all the other members of that nation, even
those who have not experienced such persecution in their countries of
residence.293 This is in part due to a sense of solidarity that characterizes
members of national groups and also stems from the fact that people tend to
project the lives of similar people onto their own lives. In the case of national
persecution, the projection has a solid rational basis—if people attach negative
attributes to a particular nationality as a basis for its persecution in one place,
287
288
289
290
291
292

(2011).

Daniel Byman, Israel’s Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring, 34 WASH. Q. 123, 123 (2011).
See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 43.
See generally Shachar, supra note 25.
Id.
Id.
But see Nahshon Perez, Israel’s Law of Return: A Qualified Justification, 31 MOD. JUDAISM 59, 68

293 Madison Margolin, Why Jewish Anxiety Is No Laughing Matter, FORWARD (Aug. 9, 2015),
http://forward.com/culture/318509/is-jewish-anxiety-no-laughing-matter/.
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there is reason for concern that the same reasons will one day be used for its
persecution elsewhere. In a reality where anti-Semitism thrives in various
locations around the world, it undermines the sense of security of all Jews,
including those who have not personally experienced anti-Semitism.294 In this
reality, any Jew who wishes to immigrate to Israel can honestly say that this is
due to the desire to live in a place where he will never be persecuted due to his
being Jewish.
CONCLUSION
The right to culture, which is well known and attested to in the context of
international human rights instruments, establishes the right to selfdetermination for the members of a national group to define itself as a nationstate, and not only as a sub-national community. From the right to selfdetermination within a nation-state derives the right, and even the obligation, of
the nation-state to give preference to its nationals in its immigration policies.
There are three driving forces behind this matter: the right of the nation’s
diaspora to live in their nation-state; the interest of the national majority group
to strengthen the nation-state’s culture; and the interests of this same group to
ensure its demographic dominance—a reality whose existence is critical to
maintaining the definition of the state as a nation-state.
The right of the Jewish people to their homeland and the right of Jewish
people to emigrate there is of course based on the right to self-determination. It
is also based on the unique and special circumstances of this people in particular,
a group that has suffered and still suffers from hatred and persecution and,
therefore, needs its own state to ensure the safety and security of its members.
The fact that the Jewish people’s right to self-determination is not acceptable to
the countries that surround it, as well as to the Israeli-Palestinian minority, only
strengthens Israel’s interest in favoring the members of the Jewish diaspora in
its immigration policies to strengthen the national identity of the country and to
ensure its existence by securely establishing the threshold demographic
conditions that will continue to define it as a Jewish nation-state.
The Law of Return grants immigration rights not only to Jews by birth but
also to anyone else who chooses to join the Jewish people. This “joining” is not
conditioned upon participation in religious ritual, ceremony, or behavior—a fact

294 THE JEWISH PEOPLE POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE PLANNING ASSESSMENT, 2004-2005: THE JEWISH
PEOPLE BETWEEN THRIVING AND DECLINE (Della Pergola et al. eds., 2005).
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which greatly weakens the criticism of the Law of Return that it is based on the
assumption that the preferential treatment in the policy is based on problematic
ethnic, racial, or religious criteria, which it is not.
The Law of Return also grants a right of Israeli immigration to Jews and nonJews alike that have no connection to Jewish culture as long as they are officially
or formally Jewish or have Jewish family ties. Since the 1990s, many of the
immigrants to Israel, under the Law of Return, have not even had this kind of
connection. Such immigration applicants cannot establish the basis of their
desire to immigrate to Israel on the right to self-determination.
Recently, a proposal was raised to cancel the automatic right of immigration
for those people lacking any cultural affinity to the Jewish people, based on the
claim that immigration like this does not strengthen the Jewish culture’s
dominance; in fact, immigration may even weaken it.295 This proposal should be
rejected because the reality shows that the vast and overwhelming majority of
immigrants to Israel who belong to this group do, at the end of the day, join the
Jewish majority, adopt Jewish culture, and assimilate into Jewish-Israeli
society,296 even if they never end up formally joining the Jewish people. Under
these circumstances, especially factoring in the demographic considerations
mentioned above, the Jewish majority has an interest in preserving the existing
arrangement and continuing to provide immigration rights to this group.
Still, while most of the immigrants who do not have a cultural attachment to
Judaism end up joining the Jewish majority and assimilating into its culture over
time, immigrants who are active members in another religion usually do retain
their own cultural identities and even form their own distinct communities and
affiliation groups. For these immigrants, there is no acquired right to immigrate,
and the State has no special interest in their absorption. Indeed, the Law of
Return today already negates the right of return for immigrant applicants that are
members of another faith, but only those immigrant applicants whose claim
under the Law of Return is based on a formal affiliation with the Jewish people
and not for those whose claim is based on familial kinship. In light of the above,
however, it might be appropriate to expand the exemption and apply it to nonJews whose eligibility is dependent on a family connection, unless they are
immigrating with a Jewish family member or are subject to persecution.
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Another argument raised as a possible justification to cancel the automatic
Right of Return granted to Jewish people is that, unlike in the past, Jewish people
today are not persecuted because of their national affiliation and, therefore, the
right to protection from persecution, which once served as the basis for the claim
of the Jewish people to self-determination, is no longer relevant. This claim is
factually incorrect in the sense that, to our great sorrow, Jewish people all across
the world are still being persecuted for being Jewish. In these circumstances, the
Jewish nation is still obligated to self-define in order to provide its members with
a place to be protected from hatred and persecution. A similar proposal—one
more limited in scope—seeks to base immigration on a claim of persecution,
conditional on the ability of the applicant to show that he or she was in fact being
persecuted because of his or her Jewish origin. This claim, too, must be rejected.
The broad extent of the hatred directed against the Jewish people validates the
tendency of the Jewish people to feel threatened and afraid, even if they have
not personally experienced a manifestation of anti-Semitism. Under these
circumstances, it can be assumed that any Jew that immigrates to Israel does so,
among other reasons, to strengthen his or her sense of security and peace of
mind. Therefore, so long as anti-Semitism is not completely eliminated and
eradicated, every Jewish person retains the moral right to immigrate to Israel
based also on the right to be protected from persecution.
In the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu, Israel is still their home. And to
return to our initial question—Is it ever morally or legally acceptable for a
nation-state to favor one or another group in its immigration policies based on
their nationality or religion?—we conclude that the answer is yes, given all of
the above factors. We leave it to others to apply these rationales in other
countries and to other laws, but we stand by the proposition that such criteria are
not inherently immoral or illegal and are sometimes justified and correct.
Certainly, from a religious perspective, these laws are not necessarily
problematic, and while Pope Francis may be right that “one who thinks only of
building walls and not bridges is not Christian,” it is also true that one who builds
bridges with express lanes may very well be Jewish.

